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Abstract 
 
Grain markets of Alemata, Maychew, Mokone, Mekelle and Himora are observed to 
operate in highly inefficient market structure, with very low level of trust at meso and 
macro level. As result the marking system is less developed and less efficient in terms of 
creating space and time utility. In which lack of finance is the most critical problem. 
Under such reality warehouse receipt system with receipts that can be used as collateral 
for loan are critical first stage needed to get the market right. If ECX’s exchange service 
has to be introduced it has to be low cost and low value added service, if not it may not 
find significant demand among grain traders.         
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Structure, conduct and performance of grain trading in Tigray and its impact on 
demand for commodity exchange 
The case Maychew, Mokone, Alemata, Mekelle and Himora  
Introduction and methodology 
Introduction   
Back ground of the study  
 
In the myth of perfect market hypothesis, with perfect information, perfect mobility of 
factors of production, large number of buyers and sellers, free entry and exit and fixed 
technology, market is the only institution that is needed to attain Pareto optimal or the 
best possible resource allocation (Stiglitz, 2001). However perfect market is a unicorn of 
economists than what is really found in real world of developing economies. Fortunately, 
perfect market theory by creating an ideal, but hypothetical condition, was able to show 
how self interested action of individuals can be coordinated to attain Pareto optimal out 
come. Such approach is used in geometry, mathematics and other fields of study, which 
use axiomatic approach to their analysis (Allen, 2002). The problem is that the economic 
reality is far from the neoclassical economic theory, compared to the reality studied by 
other field of studies and their theory.         
 
In one side, since some developing economies markets are highly imperfect and large 
number of them are missing (Stiglitz, 2001 and Sadoulet and Janvry, 1995), the 
mathematically consistent neoclassical conclusion, which assumes market allocation is 
the best possible allocation, is found to be in shaky ground. In other side, empirical and 
historical observation will make it clear that market based institutions are much better 
than other alternative institutions observed in human history. It is clear by now that 
market may not be perfect, but it is functional. The success of South Korea, Taiwan, 
China and Japan in last century, however, will give us clue where the inconsistency, 
between historical and theoretical knowledge, can be reconciled. If the assumptions of 
perfect market are some how approximated, we know where we are going. The problem 
with dependence on none market institution is that we didn’t have any clue where 
alternative institutions can take us. That is why, given our state of knowledge, it is 
advisable that countries should follow a market as main institution; while correcting the 
impact of market failures and missing markets through incorporation of alternative 
institutions in to marketing system. The idea is to take the out come of highly imperfect 
market closer to the out come that can be expected, if market were perfect. This may not 
be the only way or the best way, but given our state of knowledge on out come of 
different institutions, at micro and macro level, this is the best we can hope for
1
.    
 
One important institution to deal with market failures and missing markets is the 
development of commodity exchange. Commodity exchange, as complex matrix of 
institutions, is an integrated solution to many market failures observed in developing and 
                                                 
1
 Theoretical work in regional integration of trade can show us that such assumption is not always 
warranted, though. Regional integration can create trade diversion which can over weight trade creation. 
Means the move to ward market oriented structure may not generate positive out come in all cases. 
However given it is easy to build regional integration as stepping stone for global integration than directly 
pushing for global integration, the assumption is true if we take a longer horizon of development.    
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developed economies Gabre-Madhin and Goggin, 2005). That is why the rural 
development strategy of the country was able to conclude that the long term solution to 
market failures is to be found in the development of commodity exchange (MoI, 2001). 
In line with this strategy, the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (ECX) has been 
established having head office and trading floor in Addis Ababa and warehouse facilities 
in different parts of the country. At this point ECX is mainly trading in coffee and 
sesame. Other commodities are expected to be integrated in to the system in the near 
future. 
      
 Statement of problem and significance of the study 
 
It is well know fact that commodity exchange is an integrated solution to market failures 
observed in developing economies. The problem is that there are conditions that have to 
be satisfied before commodity exchange can be viable. In simple words commodity 
exchange is viable, if and only if it can generate significant reeducation in transaction 
cost compared to normal way of doing business.  
 
This is so because empirical evidence on performance of commodity exchange is mixed. 
In one side, out of the 20 best future trading commodity exchanges in the world 9 are 
located in developing economies (UNCTAD, 2007). These success stories are found in 
middle income countries, though (ibid). In other side, more than 20 initiatives to develop 
commodity exchange with in African countries between 1995 and 2005 are observed to 
collapse one after the other (UNCTAD, 2005). Low level of market development, 
observed in low income countries, is crating ‘an egg and chicken’ problem. The reason 
why we need commodity exchanges is to mitigate the impact of market failure. The 
problem is that commodity exchanges are highly functional, when the market failures are 
not that serious (Gabre-Madhin and Goggin, 2005). Fortunately, there is a glimpse of 
hope coming from the fact that: if commodity exchanges are tailored to the local needs of 
low income countries, they have a good odd of success (UNCTAD, 2007; Gabre-Madhin 
and Goggin, 2005 and Santana-Boado and Brading, 2000).            
 
That is why before ECX’s services are extended to more grains and more market 
locations, with huge fixed cost, there is a need to understand: how the normal marketing 
system is working and what are the gaps that can be filled by ECX. Additionally 
understanding what factors are contributing for higher preference of traders to use ECX’s 
services is fundamental for developing appropriate recommendations. Unfortunately, not 
a single study is done to fill this knowledge gap in Ethiopia. Such study is critically 
needed to save ECX from becoming another failure statistics from low income 
economies. This paper will try to fill part of the gap by focusing on markets located in 
surplus producing part of Tigray regional state.     
 
Research objectives  
 
This research has a one general objective of assessing the viability of services expected to 
be offered by ECX in surplus producing zones of Tigray region. Moreover it also has the 
following specific objectives.  
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1. To make cost and benefit analysis of expected use of ECX services  
2. To asses the willingness to pay of traders for future use of ECX’s services  
3. To study structure, conduct and performance (SCP) of grain trading  
4. To identify determinants of traders’ willingness to pay for ECX’s services, based on 
SCP of the grain markets   
5. To recommend ways to make commodity exchange more viable based on research 
result, experience of other countries and critical thinking.  
  
Description of the study area  
 
The study area includes two surplus producing Southern and Northwest Zones of Tigray 
regional state and the capital city of the state i.e. Mekelle. From Northwest Himora and 
from South Alemata, Maychew and Mokone are selected. Himora is no known for its best 
quality sesame product, which is becoming an important source of foreign exchange for 
the country. Southern zone is known for its surplus production of basic cereals. A higher 
flow of commodities is needed for ECX services to be more viable. That is why the study 
is mainly focusing in surplus producing zones of Tigray region. Mekelle is selected for its 
large population concentration and possibility of serving as regional hub for grain market 
of the region
2
. Means the study is done in part of Tigray region where the services of 
ECX can be feasible.  
                 
Methodology 
Data collection methodology 
 
The initial idea was to select 40 wholesalers from each zone based on systematic random 
sampling. However some unexpected constrainers are observed in the research sites that 
lead to modification of the sampling process. In Himora even though there were 207 
licensed traders, licensed as wholesaler, more than half of the traders were not actual 
traders. It is observed that to access bank credit what traders need is personal asset, like 
home, and wholesale license.  As result large portion of licensed traders were getting 
license just to access loan than to use it for trade. To deal with this problem a large 
amount of replacement is done while preserving the systematic nature of the data 
collection process. 123 traders are randomly selected
3
 and 39 active traders are used in 
the study. The identification of operational traders is done through labors and continues 
consultancy with grain brokers located in two locations, government officials and 
residents of the city. To add to this problem some enumerators were observed to produce 
suspicious and inconsistent data and all enumerators were not observed to collect 
accurate contingency data. That is why a second survey was done to correct the problem 
that resulted in loss of 12 traders. Since wholesale trade is done by the owner and these 
traders are highly mobile, contingency data was not collected from 12 traders. Means 39 
observations are available for most variables and contingency data is available only for 
27 traders.  
                                                 
2
 Unfortunately, observation of the study areas and study result reviles that Mekelle is not central hub for 
grain market of the state. However Mekelle can crate adequate demand to make commodity exchange 
viable in serving the customers of the city and resident traders.       
3
 They are not selected at once but as replacement as a trader is not found  
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The data collection problem in Mekelle was also constrained by three problems. First, 
significant proportion of traders rejected to participate in the data collection
4
. Second, 
even though many traders insist that there are 40 to 50 active traders in the market, there 
were 100 licensed traders in government record. This fact made the sampling process 
highly unsystematic and the project is not able to find more than 30 traders with license 
and who are willing to participate in the survey. Data was collected from the 30 traders. 
Unfortunately 10 questioners collected by one enumerator were found to be inconsistent 
and are rejected; making the effective sample in Mekelle grain market to just 20 traders. 
In South a complete census of wholesalers located in three market location of Alemata, 
Maychew
5
 and Mokone is done to have 49 observations from south. In general a 
complete data is collected from 96 traders and excluding contingence data complete data 
is collected from 108 traders. Since the replacement is done with out leaving systematic 
random sampling procedure and identification is done by using all possible source, it is 
expected the sample to be representative of Himora and of course Southern markets. 
However the result of this analysis should be accepted with grain of salt in case of 
Mekelle, since the sample may not be representative.        
  
Econometric methodology  
 
The Econometric methodology is focused in estimating the determinants of two ECX 
services i.e. warehouse receipt and exchange service of ECX. For the contingent value 
given to different warehouse receipt services (WR) which are having none zero value, 
except for 6 observations, a simple OLS model is used in the following form.  
 
i iWR ε= +βX ……………………………………………………………………1 
Where the error term ( )iε  is normally and independently distributed with constant 
variance or ( )20 ,i N IDε σ∼ . Given for most observations the latent variable is 
observed and given the alternative models will normally impose some distribution on the 
error term that may not be true, this approach is justified (Maddala, 1983)           
 
For determinants of contingent value attached to exchange service of ECX Tobit and 
Probit models are used. A given trader will be willing to pay for commodity exchange’s 
exchange service, if the benefit is higher than the cost. The benefit of commodity 
exchange, at maximum, is equal to the implicit and explicit transaction cost faced by 
traders in normal way of doing business. However there are both implicit and explicit 
costs that can be faced by using exchange service of ECX. First, traders may not able to 
benefit from their long term investment on social capital, if more impersonal exchange is 
introduced. Second a significant portion of any abnormal profit earned by networked 
traders can be lost, if transparent price discovery is introduced by exchange. Third traders 
                                                 
4
 Mostly low income traders and traders who experience legal litigation by government officials who 
accuse them for unlawful trading practice for simple storage of grain in face of sharp inflation observed in 
the country. However the rejection is mostly among low capital traders.    
5
 In May Chew 10 traders out of 14, which are involved in spatial arbitration are taken as whole sellers 
though they are having retailing license    
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have to learn new trading pattern, abandoning traditional trading practice learned over 
years. Let assume this transaction costs of normal way of doing business, represented by
T , are function of different factors, represented by tX .  
 
( )t t= f +T X ε ……………………………………………………………………………2 
If the unobserved cost is S  and which is function different factors, represented by 
s
X  it 
will be given us  
 
( )s sf= +S X ε ……………………………………………………………………………3 
Assuming both are linear in parameters, the unobserved willingness to pay function will 
be    
 
( ) ( )t s t t s t sf f β β β− = − = − + − = +T S X X X X ε ε X ε …………………………………4  
The willingness to pay is observed only if −Τ S is positive. As result, simple regression 
analysis or OLS of equation 4 will introduce estimation bias in to the parameters (Tobin, 
1958). To solve the problem, Tobit model of Tobin (1958) will have to be used to have 
unbiased estimation of the parameters. Lets define observed willingness to pay as W . So  
 
W = T - S = βX + ε        if  0>T - S  
0=W                            if  0≤T - S ………………………………………………………5 
And this will be related to the following fact in terms of probability distribution.  
 
W = T - S = βX + ε         With probability of  ( )Ω βX  
0=W                             With probability of ( )1−Ω βX
…………………………………6
 
Given the above fact the coefficient of the independent variables can be estimated by 
maximizing the following Tobit log likelihood function, assuming the error term ( )ε  is 
white noise or is having independently and identically distributed normal distribution. 
Formally ( )20 ,N IDε σ∼    
0i  I i  I 0 
LL = log log
n n
φ
σ σ∈ ∈ ≠
 − −    Φ +∑ ∑        
βX W βX
………..7  
For some types of exchange services (if exchange is completed with in one hour or less), 
it observed that few traders (7) are having zero contingent value. So in line with 
recommendation of Maddala (1983) a simple OLS model given in equation 1 is used. To 
have clear idea, who is willing to pay and who is not willing to pay could be also very 
important in addition how much they are willing to pay. So Probit model of Bliss (1934) 
will be used to answer this question. From equation 4 we can drive the following fact  
 
1DW =                         if  0>T - S  
0D =W                        if  0≤T - S ………………………………………………………..8 
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Where 0D =W  is dummy, taking value of one for those who are willing to pay some 
amount. The associated probability, therefore, will be  
 
1DW =                            With probability of  ( )Ω βX  
0D =W                           With probability of ( )1−Ω βX ………………………………..9 
Assuming the error term is white noise, the related Probit log likelihood function will be  
 
( ) ( )
0i  I i  I 0 
LL = log log 1
n n
∈ ∈ ≠
 Φ − + Φ −∑ ∑  
βX βX
…………….10  
The problem with Probit model given in equation 10 is that the distributional assumptions 
imposed in to equation 9 may not be right, as found to be the case in this paper. That is 
why maximum score estimator of Manski (1975, 1985) is also used. With out imposing 
any distributional assumptions in to the model, this model will try to estimate the 
parameters semi-parametrically. Taking the distribution function in equation 9 as 
unknown, the procedure will maximize the following score function to estimate the 
parameters ( )β .   
   
( ) ( ) ( )
0i  I
1
= 2 1 1 2
n
D
sign
n
α
∈
− − − ∑  NαS β  W βX
…………….11
 
The ( )NαS β  is  score, α  is taken to be ½ to make the model consistence with Pseudo R2 
or to select the parameters in way that predicts the observed events accurately. The 
problem with maximum score is that at this time it is not possible to estimate more than 
15 parameters due to computational complexity (Green, 2000), despite the fact that the 
effect of omitted variables on the model is unknown (Manski, 1975, 1985). To deal with 
this problem a linear probability model (LPM) which uses weighted least square (WLS) 
assuming linear probability function (see Gujarati, 2003) is used as complementary. LPM 
uses the following form  
 
i i iw= = +P(W) P βX ε …………………………………………………...12 
( )( ) 0 .5−w = P 1 - P  
Where the difference between equation 1 and equation 12 is related to the use of weights 
presented byw , in equation 12. w  is introduced to eliminate binominal distribution 
related heteroskedasticity from the data.     
 
In all cases test for distributional assumptions are done to make sure the model result are 
estimated from appropriately specified model. For OLS the most important testes are 
related to omitted variable, multicollinearity, normality and heteroskedasticity. To test 
multicollinearity variance inflating factor is used and to test heteroskedasticity Breusch-
Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity is used. When heteroskedasticity is not 
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rejected robust standard errors are reported. Omited variable are tested by using 
Ramsey’s reset test. Normality test is done by using information matrix test or Cameron 
& Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test. For Tobit and Probit models Lagrange Multiplier 
(LM) score testes are used to test for heteroskedasticity, omitted variables and normality 
(see Green, 2000 and Verbeek, 2006). Score testes use generalized residuals and artificial 
regression to fit LM test.  
 
Limitation of the study  
 
The main limitation of the study is related to the data collection process followed and 
associated problems observed. This problem in turn is caused by institutional failure of 
the University, lack of reliable list of traders and rejection of some traders to participate 
in the study, mainly in Mekelle. The low allowance of 50 birr allocated to enumerators by 
the University for Data Collection was observed to create serious adverse selection and 
moral hazard problem among enumerators. It was not possible to get best enumerators 
and the survey demanded huge supervision cost to collect reliable data. When enumerator 
has to spend 40 to 45 birr for mere survival every day in sample sites, 50 birr allowance 
was not adequate to have the best and brightest enumerators in the business. Unless the 
university is willing to change this Stone Age institution, it is believe of the researchers 
any significant result can’t be expected in future researches endeavor of the university. 
Lack of reliable list of traders is another challenge that needs to be addressed by 
concerned bodies. Third some Mekelle traders’ rejection to participate in the survey was 
caused by lack of time, lack of understanding about importance of such research and 
unnecessary intervention of government in to grain trade in the past. Traders were 
accused for uncompetitive behavior, for simply storing grain expecting higher price in the 
future, which is normal activity in grain market
6
. Officials which were not willing to 
support the data collection process with in the city was observed to intervene in normal 
trading activity behind their legal mandate, which is very puzzling to the researcher. It is 
necessary to put right regulatory service and man power to facilitate market development 
than putting unqualified staff, which does not understand the role of regulation and 
market, to regulate grain market. One way or another the main problems in this study are 
mostly caused by malfunctioning state services and institutions and over ambitions focus 
on collection of complete 41 page data by the researchers.    
 
Secondary, limitations are related to failure of both Tobit and Probit model to be 
appropriate to the data, even when heteroskedasticity in exponential form is allowed in 
the model. For Probit maximum score and LPM are used to solve the problem. The Tobit 
model is left for appendix, since there is no logical reason to accept it as true.         
 
Organization of the paper  
 
After the introductory and methodology part given above, theoretical back ground will be 
given in next section. Discussion and analysis will be given in third section to be 
followed by conclusion and policy recommendation in last section. 
 
                                                 
6
 This action of local authority is found to be unlawful in court of law  
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Theoretical back ground 
The role of grain trade in economic development 
 
The role of trade in economic development is related to the creation of time, space and 
form utility. The first problem in distribution of goods and services is related to the fact 
that time of production and time of consumption of a good may not be the same. Most 
grain in Ethiopia is often produced around September to January; but it is consumed all 
year round. This fact will create seasonal surplus, around pick season, and seasonal 
shortage, around slack season. In pick season grain price will be very low given, first, 
most of the grain that can be used for year consumption is damped in this season and, 
second, price elasticity of demand for most agricultural products is very low
7
. This will 
discourage farmers from being innovate, risk taker, adopter of advanced technology or in 
short this will discourage them from developing behavior which is pro-development. In 
slack season again the shortage of agricultural products and the high quantity elasticity of 
demand for agricultural products will result in sharp increase in grain prices. This in turn 
will create budget crises for poor consumers to reduce their level of food security. In 
short it can increase transitory poverty for poor consumers.           
 
That is why traders’ temporal arbitration of grain price will generate positive contribution 
to economic development and welfare of citizens. Traders by buying grain in pick season 
and selling at slack season will reduce the temporal price margin. This is called the 
creation of time utility, in terms of economic jargon. It is creation of utility, because, first, 
the welfare of producers at pick season and customers at slack season is improved. 
Second the reduced risk will encourage the development of pro-development behavior 
among economic agents (mainly farmers) to promote higher growth and ever increasing 
production of agricultural products.         
 
Another problem in economic development is that place of production and place of 
consumption are often different, if we use national or regional telescope. This will create 
fragmentation of trade or surplus of grain in some locations, to reduce price and 
discourage producers, and shortage of grain in deficit locations, to create serious food 
insecurity among the poor. That is why grain traders’ creation of space utility is very 
productive activity. Traders, by buying grain from surplus areas and transporting it to sale 
in deficit areas, will improve incentive of producers in food surplus areas and will reduce 
food insecurity of poor customers in food deficit areas. 
 
A third problem in distribution economics is that the form of grains supplied by 
producers and the form of consumption item demanded by customers may not be the 
same. Farmers may be supplying raw coffee but customers are looking for processed 
coffee, for example. That is why unless traders are able to process raw coffee in to ready 
to use processed coffee; there may not be significant transaction in coffee market. 
                                                 
7
 If price elasticity of demand is less than one, then quantity elasticity of demand will be greater than one. 
Means one percent increase in quantity supplied will generate more than one percent decline in price. To 
use simple words, it means since food items are necessity, people have maximum limit on the amount food 
they can consume. Under such reality increase in supply will result on sharp decline in price.        
11 
 
Therefore traders will add value, through processing, of agricultural products and by 
doing so they will expand the level of demand for agricultural products.  
 
In general if traders are given the freedom to store, transport and process agriculture 
products, they will create time, space and form utility to promote fast economic 
development.  
 
Market failures or the constrains faced by traders in creation of time, space and 
form utility 
 
In perfect market the creation of time, space and form utility is not that much complicated 
business. When there are large number of buyers and sellers, everyone will end up being 
price taker. When there is free entry and exit, everyone will earn normal profit. There is 
no product differentiation and trade is done under perfect information. Means there is no 
need for grade and standard and there is no risk or unanticipated event. What is planned 
before hand will actually happen, nothing is unexpected and what is planned will unfold 
in the future as it is planned (Stiglitz, 2001). There is perfect factor mobility. Any 
investment done in one sector can be moved to another sector without any additional 
cost, in case the first sector is overcrowded (Subramaniam and Panth, 1996). Under such 
reality trading is a very simple task done based on mere analysis of prices. The simple 
and single rule for success in grain trade is: Buy grain, whenever and wherever price is 
low; and sale it whenever and wherever price is high. Under such reality, as long as the 
price is right, market allocation among ego centric economic agents will create Pareto 
optimal space, time and form utility.  
 
The problem is that the reality that we face and the reality assumed or imposed in neo-
classical market are completely different (Stiglitz, 2001). Traders operating in highly 
dysfunctional and incomplete markets need to find appropriate solution for ever 
emanating challenges in grain trade to stay in business. The problems observed in grain 
trade are related to high transaction cost which can result on dysfunctional and missing 
markets. High transaction cost can result from one or many of the following problems 
observed in developing economies market   
 
1. Lack of appropriate grades and standards (Fafchamps and Minten, 1996b, 1999a; 
Gabre-Madhin, 2001b and Gabre-Madhin et al, 2003) 
2. Lack of adequate information and high risk (Bryceson, 1994; Fafchamps and Minten, 
1999a; Gabre-Madhin, 2001b; Gabre-Madhin et al, 2003; Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981 
and Stiglitz, 2001) 
3. Lack of access to finance (Barrett, 1997; Fafchamps, 1997a; Gabre-Madhin et al, 
2003; Jayne et al, 2002; Johnson et al, 1999 and McMillan and Woodruff, 1998) 
4. Lack of appropriate marketing infrastructure (Bryceson, 1994; Gabre-Madhin, 2001b; 
Gabre-Madhin et al, 2003; Jayne et al, 2002 and Rapsomanikis and Panayiotis, 2007)  
5. Inefficient enforcement of contract (Bigsten et al, 1998; Fafchamps, 1996; Fafchamps 
and Minten, 1996b, 1999a; Gabre-Madhin, 2001b; Gabre-Madhin et al, 2003; Jayne 
et al, 2002 and WB, 2002) 
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6. High search cost  (Gabre-Madhin, 2001a; McMillan and Woodruff, 1998 and Minten 
and Kyle, 1999) 
 
Lack of appropriate grade and standards is the norm than an exception in grain markets of 
developing economies. Under such reality, assuming the only institution at work are 
market and state, it could be very expensive and sluggish to make transaction with in 
grain market. The buyer of grain has to check each and every sack of grain. And in order 
to make sure that each sack is containing homogenous grain, it has to check different 
parts of each sack. Furthermore, if agreement is not reached on the terms of the contract, 
the process has to restart all over again. As result the trading process in market where 
tones of grain are coming and going will be very slaw and very costly. This will increase 
transaction cost related to opportunity cost of time used in screening process. Since most 
of the inspection is done by the main trader himself the opportunity cost of screening will 
be very high.  
  
Lack of appropriate grade and standard is related to lack of information on the product 
quality. But lack of information can take different form. Lack of information can be 
related to spot prices discovered on different locations, expected price dynamics of prices 
in different locations, current and expected production and expected and historic weather 
conditions of different locations. This will create serious risk on creation of both temporal 
and spatial arbitration. If prices are erratic and can expose traders to high level of risk, 
they may rationally reject to create either time or space utility, despite positive expected 
profit of temporal and spatial arbitration. Risk can have direct effect on transaction cost 
from two directions. In one side traders may try to use resource on information collection 
and making predication of future events. This will have direct impact on transaction cost. 
In other side, for given level risk, people will demand some risk premium to assume the 
risk. So risk premium will have implicit impact on transaction cost. So the existence of 
risk by increasing transaction cost can either reduce or eliminate trading all in all. In 
general theoretical analysis did clearly show that market will supply less than optimal 
information, but also it will result on increased distortion of existing information (Stiglitz, 
2001). That is why market allocation with less than adequate information will be Pareto 
optimal only by chance not by default (ibid).     
 
In face of serious lack of adequate information and lack of proper grade and standards, 
the search process between buyers and sellers will be very costly. Note that it is not only 
about finding a buyer or seller, but to find a buyer or seller with right price, quantity and 
quality. Under imperfect information and lack of clearly defined grade and standards, the 
search process will be very sluggish and very costly. This will result on high search cost 
or high transaction cost (Gabre-Madhin, 2001a).         
 
Lack of finance is another serious problem. Grain trading deals with biological products 
or product in which their out put is significant function of random natural factors. 
Random environmental and climatic changes will introduce random fluctuation on grain 
production. Such random variation in output in turn will introduce much higher 
fluctuation in grain price, due to low price elasticity of demand (high quantity elasticity 
of demand). In short, grain trading is done in face of serious quantity and price related 
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risks. That is why financial institutions are not willing to lend for grain trade, unless the 
trader can provide marketable collateral. Unfortunately, the concentration of grain 
traders’ capital on working capital will farther limit their access to finance. Since most of 
grain trading capital is concentrated in form of working capital, traders can’t provide 
marketable collateral to lending financial institutions (Gabre-Madhin, 2001b). The lack of 
collateral will increase both moral hazard and adverse selection problem, to make the risk 
faced by lenders much higher than the already high average risk found in the market.  
Under such reality, unless high risk premium is allocated to lending financial institutions, 
formal institutions may not be willing to lend to grain traders. At the same time grain 
trading with its seasonal and random variation will demand very flexible access to 
finance, and provision of such flexible access to finance will further increase the 
transaction cost of lending to grain traders. That is why grain trading is facing missing 
credit market as part of the credit market gap observed in developing economies. As is 
stated by Ageba (2006) the very rich have formal banks and the poor have MFIs, but 
there is credit market gap in serving the need of middle income bracket. This group 
includes most grain traders operating in Ethiopian grain markets. Under such reality the 
expected lack of finance will limit traders’ capacity to store, transport and process grain 
for profit or it will limit their capacity to create time, space and form utility.   
 
Lack of marketing infrastructure like roads, information communication technology 
(ICT), storage facility, transportation facility and soon will also increase the transaction 
cost of creating time, space and form utility (Jayne et al, 2002 and Rapsomanikis and 
Panayiotis, 2007). To make things worst, lack of cost effective and efficient contract 
enforcement mechanism by the judicial system of developing economies will farther 
increase the expected transaction cost of any contract (Jayne et al, 2002). If there is 
breach of contract with in grain trade or any related contract, they have to use the less 
efficient, less predictable, sluggish and very costly legal system. This is not an ideal 
situation to bet on your and your family future! 
 
In general high transaction cost can result on trade fragmentation and less efficient 
trading. This will limit traders’ activity to short term and short distance arbitration 
without any significant processing of products. This is observed to be the case for 
Ethiopia grain market according to Gabre-Madhin et al (2003).  
         
Market failure that constrain producers’ capability to contribute to economic 
development     
 
The above market failures will also constrain small scale farmers’ capacity to benefit 
from market transaction, specialization and commercialization. This is because the level 
of market failure and observed transaction cost have tendency to increase with decline in 
size of the firm (Barrett, 1997; Bigsten et al, 1998; Fafchamps, 1997a; Fafchamps and 
Minten, 1999a; Gabre-Madhin et al, 2003 and UNCTAD, 2007). To understand this fact 
lets start from an average farmer found in developing economies. Average farmer in 
developing economies will face the following serious problems in producing agricultural 
products for the market. 
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1. High production and marketing risk (Sadoulet and Janvry, 1995; Stiglitz, 2001; 
UNCTAD, 2007 and Von Braun and Kennedy, 1994) 
2. Lack of adequate information (Gabre-Madhin et al, 2003; Newbery and Stiglitz, 
1981; Sadoulet and Janvry, 1995; Stiglitz, 2001; Sadhu and Singh, 2002 and 
UNCTAD, 2007) 
3. Lack of adequate and quality storage facility (Gabre-Madhin and Goggin, 2005; 
Sadhu and Singh, 2002 and UNCTAD, 2007) 
4. High financial stress (Gabre-Madhin et al, 2003; Sadoulet and Janvry, 1995; Sadhu 
and Singh, 2002 and UNCTAD, 2007) 
5. Manipulative middle man (Sadhu and Singh, 2002) 
   
Given high dependence of farming on random natural events and high quantity elasticity 
of demand for most agricultural products, farmers will expose themselves to high level of 
risk; if they try to commercialize and specialize on few high priced but risky products 
(Sadoulet and Janvry, 1995; UNCTAD, 2007 and Von Braun and Kennedy, 1994). 
Lacking adequate information about expected production and price, farmers can easily 
expose themselves to huge amount risk, if they focus on commercialized farming 
(Sadoulet and Janvry, 1995 and Von Braun and Kennedy, 1994). It is irrational to assume 
that what ever rational decision done by small scale farmers under imperfect information 
is Pareto optimal (Stiglitz, 2001). To make things worst, the level of information 
available in the market is not only sup optimal, but also small scale farmers access to 
such incomplete information is very limited (Lovelace, 1998). Small scale farmers lack 
both capacity to invest on information and capacity to make large scale use of any 
information. That is why, small scale farmers working under highly risky environment 
with very limited information will demand high amount of risk premium to take any risky 
activity (Sadoulet and Janvry, 1995 and Von Braun and Kennedy, 1994). 
 
The lack of access to finance and modern storage facility will create stress sell among 
small scale farmers to result on impoverishing growth. Small scale rural farmers in 
addition to the high risk they are exposed, they can’t provide marketable collateral to 
access formal loan. This will increase the level of risk that has to be assumed by banks 
due to increase in adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Moreover the low 
population density in rural areas and smallness of the amount of money demanded by 
small scale farmers will increase the transaction cost of banking the rural small scale poor 
farmer. As result formal banks are not in position to bank the rural poor small scale 
farmer. This fact will create a vicious circle of poverty, where due to lack of finance poor 
farmers will not participate on rewarding activates and as result will remain poor to 
preserve their financial constrain. Moreover the lack of modern and large scale storage 
facility will result on huge crop damage and high storage cost. Under such reality if small 
scale farmers are forced to use modern inputs on credit or are forced to commercialize, it 
may result on impoverishing growth (Sadoulet and Janvry, 1995 and Von Braun and 
Kennedy, 1994).  
 
After investing on risky activity, if they fail, they have to face serious decline on their 
welfare and consumption. If they succeed, they can’t store the grain for long and at the 
same time they have to raise finance to pay for different financial obligations they have 
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(Sadoulet and Janvry, 1995). This will create stress among small scale farmers to dispose 
their out put just after harvest (Gabre-Madhin et al, 2003). When large number of farmers 
dump their out put, there will sharp decline in price, demanding more dumping to satisfy 
the financial obligation of the farmers. This will push the price farther and the cycle is 
self preserving. This fact will discourage farmers from taking risk, adopting modern 
technology, specialization and commercialization; even though that is what is expected 
from them.                
 
Last but not least is related to behavior of manipulative middle man. Given in most cases 
large number of farmers will deal with small number of traders which posses better 
information, better bargaining power, less transaction cost and lower stress, these facts 
will expose the army of small scale farmers to suffer in the hand of manipulative middle 
man. The manipulative middle man by using their better market power and better access 
to information can fix unfavorable term of trade against small scale farmers to discourage 
them from developing pro development behavior (Sadhu and Singh, 2002).   
 
Under the above stated reality, small scale farmers left to some times invisible and some 
times none existence hand of the market will fail to contribute to economic development 
of the nation. That is why we need alternative institutions to fill the gap of imperfect 
market out come and to make it closer to the out come expected under perfect market.       
            
Networks, brokers and agents as alternative institutions to mitigate the impact of 
dysfunctional or missing formal institutions 
  
Facing poor marketing infrastructure, highly inadequate information, highly limited 
access to financial resource, high risk, lack of proper grade and standard and highly 
inefficient legal enforcement, it is not nave to expect missing large scale grain market in 
developing economies. If the only institution in developing economies were market and 
state only, which are highly dysfunctional most often, then expecting some form of 
sustained large scale grain trade will be too optimistic (Fafchamps and Minten, 1999a
8
). 
However due to the existence of informal networks, brokers and agents, part of the 
market failure problem of grain market is mitigated to make large scale trading possible.  
 
When the market and the state are not in position to supply macro level trust or trust on 
the system, traders will depend on micro level trust or meso level trust
9
 (Fafchamps, 
2002; Guiso et al, 2000; Humphrey, 1998; McMillan and Woodruff, 2000 and Moore, 
1999). In perfectly functioning macro level trust exchange is anonymous. This is because 
traders’ trust is not based on other traders’ good will to be honest, but on the system to 
supply them cost effective information, risk management capacity, infrastructure, 
contract enforcement and soon. But when the market and state are not in position to 
supply macro level trust, transactions have to be personal and reputation based to 
improve efficiency (Fafchamps and Minten, 1999a). Personal transaction is manifested in 
form of networks, use of brokers and agents. Let’s start from networks.  
                                                 
8
 This is in line with flea market concept of  Fafchamps and Minten  (1999a) 
9
 When formal institutions are functional but not perfect trust  is needed since every contingency can’t be 
controlled by contract and there is some risk involved in any contract  
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Networks 
 
Networks are based on social capital built out of trust or/and sanction (Humphrey, 1998). 
“Situations in which individual agents only trust a limited number of agents they know 
individually can be described as a network” (Fafchamps, 2006, 1183). In such case 
through long term personal and business related relationship, one agent can predict the 
expected action of another agent without having adequate information on his/her actual 
action (Hayami, 1997; Glaeser et al, 2000 and Platteau, 1994a). In practical terms without 
having properly defined grade and standards, one trader can have good prediction about 
expected quality of grain that is going to be supplied by another trader (Fafchamps and 
Minten, 2002). Those traders which can trust each other to supply good quality grain will 
be part of the network, excluding others which are not trustworthy. Means the transaction 
cost of inspection to ensure appropriate quality can be avoided by exchanging grain 
among trusted network members (Fafchamps, 2002 and Fafchamps and Minten, 2002).  
 
Another problem of dysfunctional or highly imperfect credit market is that trades may not 
have flexible access to finance. However given the existence of long term personal and 
business related relationship traders can easily predict the expected credit worthiness and 
trust worthiness of other trader. Number of credit worthy and trust worthy traders will 
able to create networks and will lend and borrow from each other (Fafchamps, 1997a and 
Schmid and Robison, 1995), mostly with verbal agreement and without using any formal 
papers or without expecting to use third parity enforcement. This will enable traders to 
easily handle any short term liquidity problem and will improve the mobility of the 
limited financial resource at their disposal (Fafchamps et al, 1994, 2002 and Fafchamps 
and Minten, 1996b, 1999a, 2002).  
 
The cost of collecting information from different locations can be very expensive for 
traders which have to hire people to collect price, output and climatic information from 
different locations. But if traders can create network of traders, they can easily exchange 
different information from one location to another location without a need to pay for 
information collection process (Coleman, 1988; Rauch and Casella, 1998; Fafchamps and 
Minten, 1999a, 2002; Grootaert, 1998; Lyon, 2000 and WB, 2002).    
      
In face of highly unpredictable and risk environment and highly inefficient, unpredictable 
and sluggish legal enforcement, there is need for flexible approach to contract 
enforcement. Unfortunately, short term flexibility which can improve not only financial 
viability of traders with short term liquidity problem, but also can avoid the need to use 
the inefficient legal system, is mixed bless. Despite the above stated advantage contract 
flexibility can increase the level of risk faced by traders taking open position. That is why 
efficiency of contract flexibility demands it to be done among trustworthy network of 
traders. So the development of networks will improve the effectiveness of contract 
flexibility by avoiding the inefficient third party enforcement (Bigsten et al, 1998; 
Fafchamps, 1996; Fafchamps and Minten, 2002; Grootaert, 1998; Lyon, 2000 and 
McMillan and Woodruff, 2000).  
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However when people are trusted there is tendency to develop moral hazard and to 
breach contract.  Trusted traders can supply poor quality grain, distorted information, fail 
to honor contract terms, fail to repay debt and soon to maximize short term benefit. To 
avoid such moral hazard some form of bilateral or collective sanction is needed to be 
used (Coleman, 1988; Fafchamps, 1996; Fafchamps and Minten, 1999a; Ghosh and Ray, 
1996; Greif, 1993; Grootaert, 1998; Kranton, 1996; Lyon, 2000; Platteau, 1994b; 
McMillan and Woodruff, 1998, 2000; Moore, 1999 and WB, 2002). Bilateral sanction by 
reducing the net present value of moral hazard, it can minimize the incentive to breach 
contract (Greif, 1993). Net present value of contract embracement is the net present value 
of current breach of contract minus the present value of all expected future benefit from 
such bilateral long term trading. When the net present value is negative, rational ego 
centric individuals will have incentive to honor contract. The problem with bilateral 
sanction is that the net present value of all future benefits expected to be generated from 
long term relationship with one trader can be very small, in comparison to expected 
benefit of a single breach of contract. That is why, collective sanction, by all trustworthy 
traders, is needed to increase the expected opportunity cost of contract embranchment by 
any one. By rejecting to trade, lend and trust anyone with history of dishonest behavior 
traders, as collective, can easily avoid or reduce the occurrence of moral hazard.  
 
However if the market is not very thick, such exclusion may reduce the number of traders 
in network and it may have serious negative consequence in the future benefit of 
trustworthy network of traders (Fafchamps, 2002 and McMillan and Woodruff, 1998, 
2000). So exclusion can be replaced or can be complemented by demand for 
compensation (Harbord, 2006). A trader who defaulted in past transactions can be only 
allowed to participate in future transactions, if and only if he/she is able to pay 
compensation. Additionally if bilateral sanction is used and a trader is going to face 
serious decline in future income, he/she may try to do careful transaction with 
untrustworthy traders facing high transaction cost than using sanction (Fafchamps, 2002). 
If a trader supply him/her poor quality grain in the past, than avoiding trading with the 
trader all in all, he/she may end up making detail inspection of all future supply of grain. 
This will increase transaction cost faced by the honest trader and as result will reduce the 
benefit of future trade. But it will not reduce the expected future benefit to the 
trustworthy trader it to zero. If there is large number of honest traders, however, he/she 
can afford to exclude dishonest traders and still can make decent profit in the future.       
 
In general, moral hazard and other market failures can be solved by investing scare 
resource on information collection, legal enforcement, high search and screening cost. 
This will reduce the level of economic efficiency in the system. Fortunately, Trust based 
networks, backed by sanction and compensation to avoid the need for such transaction 
cost, can push market allocation to ward Pareto optimal level. In short, large trade 
volume under highly dysfunctional and missing markets is made possible due to 
existence of social capital among traders (Kranton and Minehart, 2000). In other words, 
the development of long term personal relationship is what moves inefficient flee market 
to ward relatively more efficient and large scale networked market (Fafchamps and 
Minten, 1999a). 
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Statistical discrimination 
 
Trust can be developed through reputation to generate micro level trust and development 
of personal networks (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Fafchamps and Minten, 1999a, 2001; 
McMillan and Woodruff, 2000; Palaskas and Harriss-white, 1993; Platteau, 1994a and 
Stiglitz, 2000), as stated above. However trust can be also defined in some socio 
economic dimension (Fafchamps and Minten, 2001; Fafchamps, 1996, 2002; Humphrey, 
1998; Platteau, 1994a, 1994b and WB, 2002). If some socio economic group behave 
trustworthy for long or if the average honest behavior of some socio economic group is 
significantly higher than others, in both numeric and statistical terms, then more trust can 
be built to ward such socio economic group. As result people who belong to such socio 
economic group will simply exchange private property based on trust without the need 
for huge transaction cost. Here trust is not earned through reputation, but inherited by 
belonging to trusted socio economic group (Alesinaa and Ferrara, 2002; Coleman, 1988; 
Fafchamps, 1996, 1997a, 2002; Greif, 1993; Humphrey, 1998; Lyon, 2000; Moore, 1999; 
Overa, 2006 and Palaskas and Harriss-white, 1993)    . 
 
However when people are trusted, ego centric individuals have an inherent tendency to 
develop moral hazard. That is why bilateral and collective sanctions and compensation 
are needed to keep the integrity of the trusted socio economic group intact. In such meso 
level socio capital initial trust is inherited, but the preservation of trust is ensured through 
good reputation (Fafchamps, 1996, 1997a; Fafchamps and Minten, 2001; Greif, 1993; 
Humphrey, 1998; Overa, 2006 and McMillan and Woodruff, 2000).  
 
There is ample evidence in literature about the prevalence of meso level trust in economic 
activity. Just to give a bird’s eye view to the literature, the following evidences are useful. 
Historically the expansion of Maghribi trade by Jew traders in 11
th
 century (Greif, 1993) 
and the expansion of Islam in East Africa (Fafchamps, 2000 and Platteau, 1994a) are 
related to the use of meso level trust to reduce transaction cost in face of serious missing 
and dysfunctional markets. Maghribi
10
 traders which represent network of Jew traders 
with trust inherited from generation to generation and preserved through reputation, 
sanction or/and compensation were able to facilitate effective trade in western 
Mediterranean in face of huge market failures, highly backward marketing infrastructure 
and extremely high risks. Similarly Arab traders were more willing to trust other Muslims 
from local community of eastern Africa than others to make transaction (Fafchamps, 
2000 and Platteau, 1994a). Under such reality, the only way local traders can participate 
in highly beneficial exchange with Arab traders was by accepting Islam as their religion. 
This fact resulted on historically unique expansion of Islam in east Africa without the 
occurrence of serious wares.  
 
To use contemporary examples the domination of business in some African countries by 
Asian and European origin Africans (Bryceson, 1994; Coleman, 1988 and Fafchamps, 
                                                 
10
 The actual nature of Maghribi traders presented by Greif (1993) is questioned by Edwards and Ogilvie 
(2009) and by Harbord (2006). However either it was exclusive Jews group or not, either it was based on 
sanction or compensation; either it was substitute for the formal system or complementary for it, it is clear 
there was some level of trust defined in ethnic lines.     
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1997a, 1999, 2002) the domination of Chinese traders in most part of East Asia (Platteau, 
1994a, 1994b), the concentration of diamond trade in hand of Jew traders (Coleman, 
1988) and concentration of different industries among few ethnic lines with in Ethiopia 
are classic examples
11
.       
 
Brokers 
 
Even though in perfect market perfect information is assumed in to the market model, in 
the real world perfect information is a unicorn. Or it is something fantasized in micro 
economic models of neoclassical economics and is never been observed in real world. 
Under highly imperfect information about supply of grain, price quoted by different 
traders and quality of grain supplied by each trader, traders will face high transaction cost 
in form of high search cost (Gabre-Madhin, 2001a, 2001b).  
 
However the existence of brokers will have significantly positive impact on reducing the 
search cost of grain trade (Gabre-Madhin, 2001a, 2001b). Than searching each other, 
number of traders can easily contact small number of brokers; which in turn have to 
search each other to clear the market. The existence of brokers will not only reduce 
transaction cost to increase volume of trade, it also have significant positive impact on 
welfare of the society (Gabre-Madhin, 2001a). 
 
Social capital among traders and brokers is also fundamental in sustaining beneficial 
bulky trade among large number of anonymous traders (Gabre-Madhin and Goggin, 
2005). The need to preserve beneficial long term relationship in face of serious sanction 
and demand for compensation, it is at best interest of the traders and brokers to avoid 
moral hazard in their trust based dealing (Fafchamps and Minten, 1999a; Kranton, 1996 
and Gabre-Madhin, 2001a, 2001b).       
 
Imperfection of alternative institutions  
 
The problem with micro and meso level trust is related to the fact that trust of some group 
implies mistrust of another group. In short, in micro and meso trust exclusion is a norm 
(Fafchamps, 2000, 2002, 2003; Fafchamps and Minten, 1999a, 2002; Greif, 1993; 
Grootaert, 1998; Kranton, 1996; Lyon, 2000; McMillan and Woodruff, 2000; Palaskas 
and Harriss-white, 1993; Platteau, 1994a, 1994b; Stiglitz, 2000 and WB, 2002). Traders 
with capital, trading skill and other resources can be easily excluded from trade because 
they did not belong to the trusted socio economic group or network of traders. Moreover 
the need to reduce the impact of gossip will push out side traders from the system until 
they are proven trustworthy, making networks exclusive groups (Greif, 1993). This has 
both efficiency and distributional side effects.  
 
Resource and knowhow of trade which is possessed by outsiders will not be utilized in 
the resource allocation coordinated by alternative institutions like networks. This will 
                                                 
11
 With in Ethiopia some businesses are more or less exclusively concentrated in hand of some ethnic 
groups. To give another example there is clear ethnic concentration with Ethiopian financial institutions 
which is generated due to existence of statistical discrimination based on meso level trust.  
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reduce the efficiency of networks. In addition to the above fact Platteau (1994b) did insist 
that meso trust, by creating fragmentation in market, will kill the development much 
efficient market. This is backed by analysis of Arnott and Stiglitz (1988) and Kranton 
(1996) which show that the efficiency consequence of alternative institutions is much 
serious. Institutions are not only result of the socio-economic structure of the society, but 
they are also means to preserve the existing socio-economic structure of the society, how 
imperfect and dysfunctional it is. If informal local institutions are well established, the 
development much efficient market (and state) institutions will be very hard business. 
Means not only they will generate less efficient allocation of resource, but also they will 
kill the development potential of much efficient institutions. Such result is widely 
documented in both theoretical analysis (Durlauf and  Fafchamps, 2004, 2006; Grootaert, 
1998; Kranton, 1996; Kranton and Minehart, 2000; Lyon, 2000; Platteau, 1994a, 1994b; 
Rauch and Casella, 1998;  Stiglitz, 2000 and World Bank, 2002) and empirical studies 
(Barr, 2000; Barrett, 1997; Fafchamps, 1996, 1999; Fafchamps and  Gubert, 2007; 
Fafchamps and  Lund, 2003; Fafchamps and Minten, 1999a; Gabre-Madhin, 2001b; 
Gabre-Madhin et al, 2003; Guiso et al, 2000; Palaskas and  Harriss-white, 1993; 
McMillan and Woodruff, 1998, 2000 and Weerdt and Dercon, 2006) focusing in all 
informal institutions in general and networks in particular.   
 
Even if the efficiency side effect is less significant, the distributional impact of such 
networks can not only lead to highly unfair distribution of economic development 
(Fafchamps, 2002, 2003, 2006; Fafchamps and Minten, 2002; McMillan and Woodruff, 
2000 and Rauch and Casella, 1998), but can also result on highly destabilizing social 
tension (McMillan and Woodruff, 2000). If economic agents which do not belong to 
some socio economic group or network are excluded from participating in mutually 
beneficial exchange of private property, they will share much lower portion of the 
developmental pie. This is the reason why there is high social tension in many African 
and Asian countries facing extreme statistical discrimination and network based traders. 
What makes such trade hard to break is because such discrimination and networking is 
self-fulfilling prophecy. Outsiders facing high transaction cost have to compete with 
networked traders facing low transaction cost. As result they have higher chance of 
failing and breaching contract, reinforcing the existing believe that they can’t be trusted 
(Fafchamps et al, 1994, 1999, 2002).  
 
To add to the problem, given social capital has a public good character (Barr, 2000 and 
Coleman, 1988), there is a tendency to under invest on social capital. This is the main 
reason why networks and meso level trusted groups may not generate macro trust and 
optimal efficiency (Coleman, 1988). 
 
If we focus on brokers, brokers which use social capital to facilitate their business will 
also face all of the above stated side effects of social capital, which can reduce their 
efficiency. Unfortunately, their efficiency will also emanate from other direction, too. 
This is related to information theory mostly propagated by Stiglitz and nicely presented 
in his Nobel Prize acceptance speech in 2001 (see Stiglitz, 2001), which can be explained 
in relation to brokers as follows. Brokers’ purpose in the market is simply related to 
information collection, information processing and contract enforcement. Given the fact 
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that self interest motivated information collection is neither Pareto optimal nor 
constrained Pareto optimal, brokers activity is not Pareto or constrained Pareto optimal. 
Information is a public good which is communicated either through intentional 
communication or behavior (action). Information is none rival but costly, so the only way 
a broker can benefit from his/her information is either by hiding the information or by 
giving wrong information. To benefit from some important information that is collected 
at some cost, a broker can hide it resulting in sup optimal information to be supplied in to 
the market. Let say a broker knows that there is higher probability that grain price will 
decline in the afternoon. If the buyer is none network member, it is at the best interest of 
the broker to hide the information and facilitate trade at higher price. As result less 
information will end up supplied to the market. Given the fact that the brokers cost and 
benefit analysis on information collection is based only on private benefit than the social 
benefit, sup optimal information will be collected and supplied by all traders. In practical 
terms it means the broker may not contact all traders or brokers to know that right price. 
He/she will stop at point where private marginal benefit is equal to the marginal cost of 
additional information. To make things worst some of the information will not be made 
public, farther reducing the level of information circulating in the marketing system. 
 
Furthermore, since information is also communicated by action or behavior, brokers can 
alter their behavior to hide information creating more distortion of information
12
. If a 
broker knows after noon price is more probable to be lower than spot price at this time, 
he/she can push network members to sell their grain now (at spot). This will 
communicate to other traders his expectation of lower price in the afternoon. If all other 
traders and brokers follow his lead, grain price will go down and the broker will fail to 
benefit from his information. The only way a broker can gain is that not only by hiding 
information but also by altering his behavior. The broker may start buying in the market 
while facilitating the shipment of network members’ grain to other locations. This will 
farther distort the information available in the market. That is why self interest motivated 
information collection, which is the norm of broker business, will never be Pareto 
optimal. For none network traders and brokers, it is often a case brokers are observed to 
disseminate distorted information intentionally. Study by Overa (2006) in Ghana did 
found that networks are also used to distribute roomers (false information) against 
competitors, supporting the above view that networked brokers can intentionally crate 
imperfect information in the market to benefit their network and hurt competitors.        
 
In short local institutions are the reason why the marketing system is functioning, despite 
high market failures and missing markets (Fafchamps, 1997b). However local institutions 
are not Pareto optimal. Means they are functional not necessarily optimal. This is why the 
development of some form of Macro trust, trust on the system, in integrated manner is a 
necessary condition for high economic development of a nation (Humphrey, 1998). What 
is interest about commodity exchange is that under right pre-conditions, it is an integrated 
solution to develop macro trust in face of serious market failures and missing markets.  
 
                                                 
12
 Practical example about exchange brokers hiding information can be found in UNCTAD (1998, 15) 
document in saying “In general, trading houses which have their own brokers on the floor spread out their 
orders over a large number of brokers not related to their firm so as not to broadcast their intentions.” 
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Commodity exchange as integrated solution to develop macro trust 
 
A commodity exchange can have different characteristics and structure as observed in 
many countries. This observation is nicely summarized in United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTED) document in saying  
  
“Commodity exchanges are defined in many different ways. For many observers in 
developed countries, a commodity exchange is a platform for the trade in futures contracts 
….. any other form of trade would not classify. In Turkey a commodity exchange could be a 
place where transaction are registered, for tax purpose – no actual trade needs to takes 
place on such exchange. In Latin America, a commodity exchange can be a place where 
credits from institutional investors to producers are facilitated – spot or future trade is not 
the object. In many countries in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union, a commodity 
exchange is like an auction floor, where any one can sell and buy what ever commodities or 
manufactured products he has available. In some cases traders have set up institutions that 
they call commodity exchange, which in effect acts as trading or brokerage operations.” 
(UNCTAD, 2005, 4) 
 
As workable definition we can take the definition given by UNCTAD and WB (1993) as 
organized or semi organized meeting place where various goods are bought and sold. 
This could include physical commodities, futures contracts or financial instruments. Or 
we can take UNCTAD (2007, 19) definition as “A commodity exchange is a market in which 
multiple buyers and sellers trade commodity-linked contracts on the basis of rules and procedures 
laid down by the exchange.” As alternative we can take Gabre-Madhin and Goggin (2005, 
4) definition as “A commodity exchange is any organized market place where trade, with 
or without the physical commodities, is funneled through a single mechanism, allowing 
for maximum effective competition among buyers and among sellers.” 
 
The main focus of this part of this paper is not to define commodity exchange, but to 
show under some conditions commodity exchange is an integrated solution to most 
market failures observed in grain market of developing economies. So let’s focus on it. 
Commodity exchange is not only effective solution to the side effects of micro and meso 
level social capital, but also to the problems that lead to dependence on micro and meso 
level social capital. That is why commodity exchange is taken as an integrated solution to 
market failure problems widely observed in developing economies. The idea is explained 
in some detail below.     
 
Commodity exchange will develop grade and standard that has to be used by 
participating traders. Having clearly defined grade and standards, the exchange will 
facilitate the screening process. By doing so it will avoid traders’ risk of buying poor 
quality grain (UNCTAD, 2005). Since grade and standard are public good like any 
information, it is very cost effective, if they are supplied by central institution, like 
commodity exchange. Once grains are screened for their quality and appropriate quality 
tag is given to them, they will be stored in certified and modern warehouses to reduce 
storage cost and crop damage (Gabre-Madhin et al, 2003 and UNCTAD, 2005). Due to 
existence of dimensional economics and use of modern storage facility, there will be 
significant reduction in storage cost and crop damage, in short transaction cost of storage.   
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Depositing their grain in warehouse farmers and trades will get warehouse receipts 
(Gabre-Madhin and Goggin, 2005 and Rutten, 2001). The receipt can be used for 
exchange specification within the commodity exchange or outside the commodity 
exchange or it can be used as collateral for loan
13
 (Gabre-Madhin et al, 2003 and Gabre-
Madhin and Goggin, 2005). The use of quantity and quality of grain specified in 
warehouse receipt as base of exchange will facilitate the transaction process (Rutten, 
2001; Gabre-Madhin et al, 2003; Gabre-Madhin and Goggin, 2005). The above fact 
coupled with the fact that exchange within commodity exchange is done on standardized 
contracts, there will be very low transaction cost, in general, and very low search cost, in 
particular (Gabre-Madhin et al, 2003, Gabre-Madhin and Goggin, 2005 and UNCTAD, 
1998a).  Moreover the receipt can be used as collateral to have flexible access to credit 
needed by traders (Gabre-Madhin and Goggin, 2005 and Rutten, 2001). Considering the 
price risk involved in holding grain as collateral, the loan by financial institutions will be 
provided in discount basses, though (Gabre-Madhin et al, 2003).  
 
This system in addition to its provision of flexible access of credit to traders can also 
solve the stress sell that can be faced by farmers. If farmers expect price increase in 
future which is greater than the storage and interest cost of using warehouse based loan, 
they can deposit their grain with in warehouse at much lower cost and can borrow from 
banks to cover their short term financial needs. Means warehouse receipt system will 
reduce both stress sell faced by farmers and will improve financial flexibility of traders. 
At the same time better storage facility will be provided to farmers.                 
 
The most important advantage of commodity exchange is related to its institutions which 
enable the development of macro trust without using the less efficient, less predictable 
and costly legal system. These institutions are required margin, limit in daily variability 
of price, minimum deposit requirement and mark to market settlement (Gabre-Madhin et 
al, 2003 and UNCTAD, 1998b). The focus at this time is on required margin and control 
on daily price variability. The other two will be explained once future and option trading 
are introduced.  
 
To stabilize the market and to give traders enough time to process information in face of 
group thinking, which is widely observed in exchanges (Smith, 1991), commodity 
exchange will normally limit the maximum amount of change allowed in price of grain in 
one day. If grain price show dramatic decline or rise, which is above acceptable limit, the 
commodity exchange will stop trading and will start it next work day. Fortunately, this 
has positive effect on reducing the risk exposed by commodity exchange. If the 
maximum change in price that can be allowed in one day is, say, 200 birr and trade 
transaction will take 1 day to complete, commodity exchange can demand required 
margin of, say, 300 birr. If a trader after depositing 300 is able to buy teff for 1000 birr. 
But before the transaction is completed teff price turn out to be 800 birr, he/she can easily 
breach contract to save 200 birr. In such case the initial contract will end up cancelled, 
the grain will be sold at 800 birr and 200 birr from the deposit will be used to pay the 
seller 1000 birr. By breaching contract the defaulting side will not able to gain but will 
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 It is preferable to have two receipts one that can be used for loan and another for quality specification in 
exchange. 
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lose future right to use commodity exchange services (Smith, 1991). Assuming 
commodity exchange has strong advantage over the next best alternative, the breaching 
trader will have to face high transaction cost which can push him out of market in face of 
serious competition. In short with in commodity exchange it is at best interest of 
participating bodies to honor contract. Anyone who wants to buy or sell with in 
commodity exchange can buy and sell without belonging to specific network or social 
group. In short it will build macro level social capital. Within meso and micro
14
 level 
social capital you are guilty until proven innocent, but with in macro level social capital 
you are innocent until proven guilty.  
 
Farther cohesion in to the system can be introduced by limiting trade between char 
owning brokers, which buy and sell grains for themselves and as agent of others (Gabre-
Madhin and Goggin, 2005). Share owning or chair owning brokers are ultimate owners of 
the commodity exchange. As result profitability and integrity of the commodity exchange 
is a very important corner stone for gaiting fair return on their investment (Lovelace, 
1998). 
 
Another problem of grain market is related to high output and price risk in face of 
missing risk management institutions and highly imperfect information. There must be a 
mechanism to increase the availability of reliable information and to efficiently manage 
the risk found within grain trading system. Future and option trading will introduce 
efficient risk management capacity among traders
15
 (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981 and 
UNCTAD, 1998a, 1998b). Such products not only will improve risk hedging capacity of 
traders by transferring risk from risk averse individuals to ward risk takers, for price 
(Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981 and Smith, 1991), but also will introduce efficient future 
price and risk premium discovery mechanism (Gabre-Madhin et al, 2003; Newbery and 
Stiglitz, 1981; Smith, 1991 and UNCTAD, 1998b, 2007 )
16
. In order to beat the market 
prediction and make profit, economic agents will have incentive to supply whatever 
important information found at their disposal (Smith, 1991). So spot and future prices and 
risk premiums discovered in spot, future and option markets are optimal prices 
discovered after considering all important information found in the system (Newbery and 
Stiglitz, 1981 and Smith, 1991). Assuming there is adequate information within the 
marketing system in first hand, much efficient information processing, risk management 
and constrained Pareto optimal resource allocation will result from the existence of 
commodity exchange with spot, future and option trading (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981 
and Stiglitz, 2001).  
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 This is completely right for micro level social capital but for meso level social capital the reverse is the 
case for trusted socio economic group members.  
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 Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) argue that for continuously stored commodities, like grains, the risk 
management capacity of future markets is not better than simple temporal arbitration by using storage. To 
back this they show the empirical fact that for such commodity, future price is as volatile as spot price. 
However in imperfect market with limited storage facility and imperfect future price discovery, it can’t be 
denied future market is fundamental for risk management, if it is viable.     
16
 The most important advantage of market over planned economy is its capacity to summarize most of 
important information found in the system in to few prices (Hayek, 1945). Under risk a market economy 
needs option and future trading to efficiently manage risk and put right price on risk, too (Newbery and 
Stiglitz, 1981).   
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Even with in future and option trading, the existence of required margin, minimum 
margin and mark to market settlement will create an incentive mechanism for 
participating economic agents to honor contract and avoid moral hazard (Smith, 1991 and 
UNCTAD, 1998b, 2007). To avoid accumulation of lose over long period of time, every 
gain and loss observed every day will be marked to the deposit kept in hand of 
commodity exchange or required margin. If the required margin or deposit is below the 
minimum margin needed to offset maximum lose expected in one day the trader or broker 
have to put additional deposit to keep the future or option contract intact. If not the 
contract will end up canceled and new contract will be issued using the new price and the 
difference in value will be compensated by using the deposit of the trader facing loss 
(Smith, 1991). This is why commodity exchange can enforce future and option contracts 
without depending on less efficient legal enforcement mechanism. Moreover the 
possibility of temporary and permanent exclusion of contract breaching agents from 
future engagement with in the commodity exchange will farther discourage the 
development of moral hazard.  
 
Another advantage of commodity exchange is related to its capacity to serve as 
information hub (Gabre-Madhin and Goggin, 2005 and UNCTAD, 2007). Since 
information is a public good, its efficient provision demands central supplier and 
commodity exchange can be efficient investor for grain trade related information. 
Information collected from wider economy and different prices discovered with in the 
exchange can be supplied at much lower cost to the general public and traders to improve 
allocative efficiency (Gabre-Madhin and Goggin, 2005 and UNCTAD, 2007). Small 
scale farmers in both China and India, for example, are observed to benefit and make 
much better allocative decision by using future prices discovered in exchange and 
broadcasted for them, though they are not participating in one (UNCTAD, 1998b, 
2007)
17
.  
 
Possible commodity exchange failures  
 
Commodity exchange is an integrated solution to most market failures, missing markets 
and dysfunctional formal institutions observed in developing economies’ market (Gabre-
Madhin and Goggin, 2005). However commodity exchange experience in developing 
economies, if not a complete failure is observed to be a rare success. A survey by 
Santana-Boado and Brading (2000) did conclude that at 2000 there were over 20 
countries with major commodity exchanges. And in the last decade many new exchanges 
has appeared in developing countries but most of them did disappear in failure. Similar 
conclusion is reached by UNCTAD (2005) in concluding that in African countries 
excluding SAFEX (South African Exchange) although some initiatives are still ongoing 
and it is perhaps too early for definitive judgments, in the last 10 years 20 initiatives to 
run commodity exchange at national or regional level have been failed. So commodity 
exchange how romantic it sounds to the reader is not panache for success.  
 
There are critical problems that need to be addressed for successful implementation of 
commodity exchange. First we need to understand market as complex matrix of 
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 But education on how to use such information was also fundamental in their success (UNCTAD, 2007)  
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institutions that guide the behavior of economic agents in given direction by using 
material reward as incentive (Reinert, 2009). So what are looking is to complement the 
dysfunctional institutions, which are giving suboptimal incentive, by alternative 
functional institutions that can be enforced in cost effective manner. So in line with 
induced institutions theory (Hayami, 1997) not only the benefit but also the cost of 
enforcement has to taken in to account.  
 
What commodity exchange is trying to doing is to change (or complement) some of the 
formal and informal institutions to reduce transaction cost. So commodity exchange as 
market based institution need to have transaction cost advantage over the normal way of 
doing business, to be viable. This is in line with reflection by Santana-Boado which state 
that in general a “commodity exchanges can play many different roles, and which roles it 
needs to play will depend on specific conditions –indeed, an exchange that does not meet 
the specific needs of the market has littlie or no chance of survival. This underlines the 
fact that copying existing models, however successful they may be, is not a recipe for 
success. Much can be learnt from the existing exchanges, from their history, their success 
and their failures, but they do not provide a blueprint for new exchange 
initiatives…..therefore… the decision to start a new commodity exchange should be 
guided by certain prerequisites, among them: …do the conditions exist for the creation of 
the commodity exchange? … and … will the commodity exchange play a relevant role in 
economic development of the country?” This is because if there are needs, organizing an 
exchange to serve these needs has proven very difficult in the past century. And many 
exchanges have gone out of business even those which were successful for some time 
(Santana-Boado, 1998, 46). It is important to know that exchanges are versatile and are 
useful on different locations (UNCTAD, 2007), but to be useful they need to serve 
specific local needs. Moreover there are important challenges expected in establishment 
and sustenance of any commodity exchange. These are dealt, below.     
 
If social capital was able to reduce some of the transaction cost for insiders and to some 
extent to outsiders, commodity exchange need to have comparative advantage in 
transaction cost related to normal way of doing business based on trust. In other words, 
the benefit of commodity exchange for both insiders and outsiders need to overweight the 
cost of using commodity exchange. However in case of insiders the benefit needs to be 
not only higher than the normal transaction cost faced with in the exchange, but also the 
implicit opportunity costs expected to be faced by insiders
18
.  
 
This problem is farther complicated by following facts. First, most of the cost of 
commodity exchange is fixed in nature. So there is need for critical flow of goods to 
break even with fixed cost of commodity exchange. In other words commodity exchange 
is viable only in areas where adequately large flow of trade is available (Santana-Boado, 
2001 and UNCTAD and WB, 1993). The Kenya agriculture commodity exchange limited 
(KACE) for example was not able to break even with its cost, at late 1990’s, due low 
trade volume that it was experiencing (Mukhebi, 1998). Trade volume is also critical to 
avoid extreme volatility in prices discovered with in commodity exchange (UNCTAD, 
2007) 
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Moreover variable cost is function of number of transactions not volume of transaction. 
As result small scale participants like outsider traders and small scale farmers may face 
high cost of using commodity exchange (UNCTAD, 2007). Following the KACE 
example small scale farmers were not able to participate in KACE exchange (Mukhebi, 
1998), until they were organized in to cooperatives to rip economic of scale advantage in 
exchange (Mandl and Mukhebi, 2002). So unless there is huge transaction cost 
advantages for both networked and un-networked traders and farmers, commodity 
exchange may fail to attract adequate volume of trade to be financially viable. 
Fortunately, part of the problem faced by small scale farmers can be solved by organizing 
them under cooperatives (Gabre-Madhin et al, 2003).            
 
Another problem is the use of warehouse without clearly defined grade and standards can 
result in accumulation of poor quality grain in warehouse and this may create moral 
hazard of supplying lower quality grain. This can kill buyers’ incentive of using 
commodity exchange. In short for having functional warehouse system properly defined 
grade and standard is fundamental (Gabre-Madhin et al, 2003 and Gabre-Madhin and 
Goggin, 2005)   
 
Additional problem is related to the fact that: if there is less than adequate or distorted 
information in the system, whatever information that is summarized in spot, future and 
option prices will end up being distorted and unreliable (Gabre-Madhin et al, 2003; 
Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981; Stiglitz, 2001 and UNCTAD, 2007). That is why commodity 
exchange operating with less than optimal information may fail to generate efficient price 
discovery. Commodity exchange is efficient processor of information and if it is feed 
garbage, the output will be nothing but efficiently processed garbage. This is partial 
reason why future and option prices, in many exchanges around the world, are observed 
to have high volatility (Stiglitz, 2001 and UNCTAD, 2007)
19
. Means spot, future and 
option prices may fail to give reliable prediction of marketing clearing prices at different 
period of times. That is why adequate and reliable information need to exist in the system 
first hand for prices discovered within the commodity exchange to be efficient shooting 
stars resulting on efficient resource allocation within the economic system.  
 
Moreover under pricing in future and option markets under adequate information can be 
efficient mechanism to communicate information about grains expected to have lower 
price on the future. However, under exchange operating with less than adequate 
information, under pricing can be used by dominant (price leader) agents to influence 
grain prices
20
. If there is adequate information in the system and some price leader is 
under pricing future price of a given grain, others, having better prediction, will bet 
against him to keep the system efficient. However in less the optimal information market, 
other traders will not have the capacity to have better prediction than price leaders. In 
such reality others will normally follow the tendency of price leader. This can create 
mass psychology (Smith, 1991) to distort grain prices. 
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 High volatility in south African future market was partially related to lack of adequate information in the 
system for example (UNCTAD, 2007)     
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 Index trading can also inject such problem (UNCTAD, 2007)     
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Moreover optimal storage decision can be done by warehouse users, if and only if there is 
optimal information in the system (Gabre-Madhin et al, 2003). For practical impact of 
asymmetric and sub optimal information on price discovery with in commodity 
exchanges see UNCTAD (2009) document. For theoretical analysis of future trading with 
less than optimal information see Newbery and Stiglitz (1981). In short commodity 
exchange having less than optimal information will introduce basis risk
21
 in place of spot 
risk (Smith, 1991).    
 
There are other ways in which commodity exchange can also increase the level of risk 
observed in the market. To participate in future and option trading what is needed is to 
put some deposit in form of deposit margin. As result economic agents will have capacity 
to take positions on capital which is many folds of their own capital. Means they can take 
risk on money that they did not posses and this can increase the risk injected in to the 
system (Smith, 1991).  This is why commodity exchanges without adequate and effective 
state over sight to control excessive risk taking by traders, public information collection 
and distribution, and efficient and functional antitrust laws can be recipe for disaster than 
success (UNCTAD, 2007)
22
.  
 
In conclusion it is true commodity exchange is an integrated solution to most of the 
market failures and missing markets observed in developing economies’ market as stated 
bt Gabre-Madhin and Goggin (2005). Commodity exchange is also functional and useful 
in many developing economies as 9 out of 20 top future exchanges are located in 
developing economies (UNCTAD, 2007). However it is not a recipe for success 
everywhere. It needs to address serious short coming of the local marketing system to 
generate significant reduction on transaction cost. Moreover clearly defined and 
transparently enforced state institutions are needed to keep it intact.          
   
Discussion and analysis 
Structure, conduct and performance of grain trading in the study sites 
   
If some of the necessary precondition for success of commodity exchange are related to 
its capacity to reduce transaction cost compared to normal way of doing business based 
on social capital, it needs to address major short comings of the normal way of doing 
business. That is why the study of structure, conduct and performance of current way of 
doing business is very fundamental, for future success of commodity exchange.      
 
Market structure and conduct from new institutional economics prospective 
 
Market structure and associated conducted, which are codependent on each other, will 
determine out come of the market. Than assuming and trying to analyze the 
codependence and interaction between structure and conduct as often is case in SCP 
studies, the focus here is to analyze their combined effect on performance. With 
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discovered in maturity or strike date (Smith, 1991).  
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 However state regulation needs to be principle based than ad hock, for effectiveness (UNCTAD, 2007)     
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institutional economics the market structure will affect the conduct of traders and 
conducted of traders and the spontaneous evolution of institutions in turn will modify 
market structure. This is why both structure and conduct of traders are presented together 
below.  
        
Capital and working capital 
 
Important variables which can determine the structure and conduct of traders are the level 
of working capital, specifically, and capital, in general, available at disposal of traders. 
The first and important assumption in perfect market model is that there are large number 
of buyers and sellers. So the concentration of capital would be an important indicator of 
level of competition in grain market. Market concentration can be analyzed by 
concentration index (C) which shows the market share of ‘N’ largest firms or by 
Herfindahl index of market concentration (H). Herfindahl index of market concentration 
(H) has an advantage of being dependent on all observations than ‘N’ largest firms in the 
industry. Herfindahl index of market concentration (H) is calculated as sum of the square 
of each and every firm’s market share. The largest the value the higher will be the 
concentration and the less competitive the industry will be.  
 
Table 1 Concentration index (C) by location  
Location 
  
Over all Capital Working Capital 
5 firms C index 4 firms C index 5 firms C index 4 firms C index 
Alemata 0.86 0.24 0.91 0.12 
Himora 0.71 0.17 0.59 0.23 
Maychew 0.72 0.55 0.71 0.53 
Mekelle 0.9 0.3 0.88 0.34 
Mokone 0.64 0.47 0.58 0.41 
All 0.64 0.6 
 
Given grain trade is a high turnover industry over all capital, in general, and working 
capital, in particular, is an important indicator of market power
23
. To analyze the 
concentration of market power, 5 firms concentration index is given in second column of 
table 1, above. As can be seen from the table over all concentration of market power is 
very high in all markets as more than 64% of the capital is owned by the top 5 traders. 
However there is significant variation from location to location. The highest 
concentration index is observed in Mekelle with value close to 90%. Means the rich 5 
traders did own close to 90% of the capital owned by all traders. The next highest 
concentration is observed in Alemata with C index of more than 85%. However if the 
richest trader is taken out of picture, the concentration index of Mekelle and Alemata will 
decline to less than 30% and less than 25%, respectively. Given the fact that C index of 
50% and more is used as rule of tamp of high market concentration, the above result 
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shows that, if the richest trader is excluded from the picture, market power of the other 
four next rich traders is not that high and the markets are competitive enough.  
 
Relatively the least concentration of market power is observed in Mokone, Himora and 
Maychew with C index of 64%, 71% and 72%, respectively. Still these results show high 
market concentration within these markets too. However, again, when the top firm is 
taken out of the picture, while market concentration of both Mokone and Maychew is 
observed to remain around 50%, market concentration of Mekelle is observed to decline 
to less than 18%. Taken at its face value this result means there are few or one trader/s 
which can have more than proportional influence in the market allocation, while there is 
more or less balanced distribution of power among other traders. In simple words there is 
higher chance that a single rich trader will have higher influence in market allocation 
decision of both markets.  
 
Unfortunately there are critical short coming in the above analysis. Given high 
inflationary tendency observed in the country from 2006 to 2009, price of fixed assets 
like storage facility and shops are observed to increase at much faster rate. Second some 
assets may be in form of tracks, which can’t offer that much significant advantage to the 
traders. As long as you can use service of tracking service providers, the amount of 
capital represented by track ownership may not be proportional to generated market 
power.  That is why the analysis has to be done not only based on over all capital but also 
on working capital, the most of important asset in grain trade. However the C index given 
in table 1 above for working capital is numerically different from result observed based 
on over all capital, but is showing the same trend.    
 
In general, based on distribution of overall capital and working capital there is clear 
evidence for market concentration in all sites. This is consistent with finding in 
Madagascar, Malawi and Benin grain markets by Fafchamps and Minten (2001).   
However while Alemata, Mekelle and Himora are evolving toward monopolistic 
competition with single dominant trader having huge market power (possibly can act as 
price leader); in case of Mokone and Maychew the market is evolving to ward 
monopolistic competition with out price leader.  
 
Table 2 Herfindahl index of market concentration (H) 
Location Capital Working Capital 
Alemata 0.4 0.64 
Himora 0.3 0.16 
Maychew 0.12 0.13 
Mekelle 0.4 0.33 
Mokone 0.1 0.09 
All 0.12 0.1 
   
Another indicator of market concentration is Herfindahl index of market concentration 
(H) which is given for both working capital and over all capital in table 2, above. With H 
index Mekelle and Alemata are showing high level of market concentration, followed by 
Himora. The lowest market concentration is found in Mokone and Maychew, 
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respectively. For all sites the H index is very low (0.12) but there is high concentration at 
local level and some markets.  
 
However the possibility high level of competition on low priced grains is possible despite 
high concentration of capital at market level. Transaction cost data collected from sites 
show that except in rare cases and coffee, transaction cost does not show significant 
variation from grain to grain. As result it is observed that rich traders tend to concentrate 
on grains which demand more capital like teff, coffee and sesame, leaving normal and 
inferior grains like wheat, maize and barley to small traders. By doing so large traders 
can generate more profit from luxury and export grains, while small traders are left to 
serious competition on other grains with low level of profit. So if we take grain by grain, 
market structure in surplus producing zones of Tigray, the market seems to take two 
different structures. While markets on export grains and luxury grains are tending toward 
oligopoly market structure, other grains are evolving to ward monopolistic competition 
market structure. This is not farther dealt her given it will take us behind the scope of the 
paper.           
 
Business fixed assets 
 
Most business assets can be rented or hired in the market. So assuming perfect 
competition, it does not matter who owns what in terms of business asset. However in 
imperfect market that we face in real world, asset ownership will have significant impact 
on competitive edge of traders. Important business assets include storage facility, 
weighting scale, trucks, and Information communication technologies (ICT).  
 
Weighting scale is found to be owned by 78% of the traders in all study areas (see table 3 
below). 90% of traders in Homera and 94% of traders in Mekelle are found to own 
weighting scale. Except in Mokone and to some Extent Maychew most traders in other 
locations did own their own weighting scale. Another important business asset is storage 
facility which is found to be owned by 57% of traders. However most of the storage 
facility is found in Himora and Mekelle with 81% and & 75% of traders, respectively, 
having their own storage facility. Serious lack of storage is observed in Maychew and 
Alemata followed by Mokone. In general, the average availability of storage facility is 
better in sampled Tigray markets compared to the national average presented by Gabre-
Madhin (2001b). With in sampled sites southern Tigray is observed to be the worst 
effected part of the markets, in terms of lack of access to proper storage.     
    
Table 3 Percentage of traders with different business assets  
 Fixed Asset Alemata Himora Maychew Mekelle  Mokone All 
Weighting  Scale  0.82 0.9 0.69 0.94 0.36 0.78 
Storage 0.35 0.81 0.23 0.75 0.43 0.57 
Truck 0 0.48 0.08 0.13 0 0.2 
Mobile phone 1 1 1 0.94 1 0.99 
Fixed line phone 0.47 0.39 0.23 0.44 0.64 0.43 
Fax 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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The most abundant marketing infrastructure is mobile phone in which 99% of traders are 
observed to have a mobile phone. Except for few traders with in Mekelle all traders in all 
locations are found to own their own mobile phone. Moreover close to 43% of all traders 
are observed to own fixed line phone in which most are located at Mokone (64%), 
Alemata (47%) and Mekelle (44%), respectively. The lowest use of fixed line phone is 
observed in Maychew and Himora with 23% and 39% of traders, respectively, using 
fixed line phone. Unfortunately, in all locations and sampled traders not a single trader 
was found to have access to Fax.  
 
In terms of trucks 20% of the traders are observed to own track but most of the traders are 
observed to own truck are located in Himora and Mekelle only. Given the fact that there 
is large scale expansion of ICT technology in the country, the availability of mobile and 
fixed line phone may not give us clear guide to grain market structure. What can be said 
is that contemporary traders have more access to information that can be collected either 
by mobile or fixed lone phone compared to what it use to be the case (see Gabre-Madhin, 
2001b for early years access to mobile phones) . Similarly weighting scale is found to be 
widely possessed by most traders. However when fixed assets which demand huge 
investment like trucks and storage facility are involved, only traders located in Himora 
and Mekelle are observed to afford them. For most traders located in other markets 
access to such assets is found to be very restricted. So unless there is easy and efficient 
access to rentable storage and transportation facility, it is logical to expect better temporal 
and spatial arbitration in Mekelle and Himora compared to southern markets.             
 
Education of the owner  
 
Some form of education at least capacity to read and write, to count and keep accounting 
records is fundamental for doing effective business in grain market. Moreover higher 
education could be very important catalyst for modernization of grain market, which we 
hope to see in the future. Holding other things constant, educated individuals are 
expected to have competitive edge over others.  
 
As can be seen from table 4, below, 80 – 90% of the traders in each location are either 
elementary school or junior high school complete. In general the education level achieved 
by the traders may not be adequate for modern trade, but is more or less adequate for 
traditional trading business done in the country and region. So it seems in all locations 
grain trade is rarely done by both illiterate and highly educated individuals.  
 
Table 4 distribution of education among traders in percentage  
Location Illiterate Elementary junior and 
high 
Post 
high 
informally literate and 
calculator literate 
Alemata 0.06 0.78 0.11 0.06 0 
Maychew 0 0.31 0.62 0 0.08 
Mokone 0.07 0.57 0.29 0 0.07 
Mekelle 0 0.56 0.28 0.06 0.11 
Himora 0.03 0.22 0.59 0.06 0.09 
All 0.03 0.45 0.4 0.04 0.07 
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The modal trader in Alemata, Mokone and Mekelle is at elementary level but the modal 
trader in Himora and Maychew is at junior high and high school level. Since Himora is 
very dynamic city with a lot of employment and business opportunity, it is logical to 
conclude that relatively better educated individuals are pulled by better opportunity found 
in grain trade. Maychew is not that dynamic city due to two factors. In one side a national 
high way that connects Tigray to the rest of the country, that use to pass through 
Maychew, is diverted to ward other short distance high way that passes through Mokone. 
This will cause significant reduction in business activity with in the city. Second the level 
of agricultural production around Maychew is very low compared to neighboring market 
towns. Consultancy, traders in the market made it clear that Maychew is net buyer than 
seller in most grains. As result it is logical to expect that low alternative opportunity in 
the town. The implication for this study is that relatively better educated individuals are 
pushed to ward grain trade by lack opportunity in Maychew city. In other locations grain 
trade is not found to be an occupation for relatively better educated one.   
 
Religion and language spoken 
 
Some times meso level social capital can be defined in religious dimensions, as was the 
case in early days of Islam expansion in Eastern Africa. Understanding the religious 
composition of the traders is very fundamental for understanding the impact of religious 
values in creating meso level trust or social capital.  In all locations more than 92% of 
traders included in the sample are Orthodox christen and what is left are Muslims. There 
is no any evidence of involvement by other religious groups and the trade seems to be 
more or less dominated by Orthodox christens with in the markets studied in this paper.     
 
Table 5  distribution of relgion in percentage   
Religion Alemata Maychew Mokone Mekelle Himora All 
Orthodox 1 1 0.928571 0.944444 0.969697 0.96875 
Muslim 0 0 0.071429 0.055556 0.030303 0.03125 
 
Language can be a very critical barrier for cross ethnic group trade for country like 
Ethiopia with very diverse ethnic composition. That is why traders’ capacity to speak and 
communicate in different languages is very critical for successful trading. Table 6, below, 
shows most of traders in all locations did speak the regional official language of Tigrigna 
and the official national language of Amharic. What is surprising is that more than 50% 
of traders in Maychew claim to speak English. This is very questionable and it is possible 
that the traders’ capacity to use few words of English learned in junior and high school 
can be claimed as speaking English. So it is not logical to accept the above result at its 
face value. 
 
Excluding Maychew, traders’ capacity to communicate in English is very limited. The 
implication is that given Amharic is widely spoken in most part of the country, these 
traders can easily communicate and do business everywhere in the country. However 
traders’ capacity to penetrate international market can be somehow constrained by their 
incapacity to communicate in international language of business, i.e. English. 
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Table 6 number and distribution of languages used by traders 
Location 
 
average number of 
languages spoken 
Percentage of traders who speak 
Tigrigna Amharic English Arabic 
Alemata 2.11 1 1 0 0 
Maychew 2.69 1 1 0.54 0.08 
Mokone 2.07 1 0.93 0 0 
Mekelle 2.18 1 1 0.06 0.12 
Himora 2.94 1 0.97 0.09 0.88 
All 2.48 1 0.98 0.12 0.34 
 
Fortunately 88% of traders in Homera and 34% of all traders in the sites did speak Arabic 
of Sudan version. Given Arabic is the second widely spoken language in the world, 
penetrating middle east, north Africa and some East Asian countries’ may not be that 
tough or at least will not be constrained by language. In general religion and language did 
not seem to be important differencing characteristics of traders.  
 
Social capital 
 
Social capital as an important factor of conduct will not only be influenced by market 
structure but also is a fundamental influence on market structure. The over all market will 
achieve better efficiency, under imperfect market, by institutions directly or indirectly 
related to social capital. That is why there is need to asses the level of social capital for 
clear understanding of market structure and conduct.   
 
Studies use the question “do you think most traders in local (distance) market can be 
trusted?” to measure the existence of meso trust defined in terms of being trader. This 
answer to this question is used in this paper to identify the level of meso level trust found 
among traders and to ward the general public. The result is given in table 7, below.     
 
Table 7 Meso level social capital for traders located in the same market 
Location 
Level of trust on local 
traders 
Level of trust on local 
residents 
Difference on trust  
(traders – residents) 
Alemata 0.33 0.58 -0.25 
Maychew 0.15 0.85 -0.7 
Mokone 0.5 0.9 -0.4 
Mekelle 0.6 0.93 -0.33 
Homera 0.12 0.77 -0.65 
All 0.31 0.8 -0.49 
 
From table 7 above it can be observed that there is serious miss trust among traders which 
is much higher compared to miss trust observed to ward none traders. 80% of all traders 
believe that most people in the sample sites are trust worthy, but only 31% of them 
believe most traders are trust worthy. The highest mistrust of trades relative to none 
traders is observed in both Maychew and Homera. Better meso level social capital 
development potential is observed in Alemata, Mekelle and Mokone, respectively. In 
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general, however, there is no strong meso level social capital defined in terms of 
belonging to trading group. If there is any social capital with in grain market, it has to be 
defined in terms of micro network level social capital
24
. 
 
In literature micro social capital is grossly measured by number of traders that a trader 
knows, share information and have business related relationship. This is defined as gross 
social capital in this paper. In this paper farther refinement is done by collecting 
information on number of traders that a trader collects information (information network) 
and can borrow in kind or cash for one day (loan network)
25
.       
          
On average one trader is observed to know more than 26 traders in own market. 
However, a trader will share market information with only 10 traders and will only able 
to borrow for one day from less than 6 traders only (see table 8, below). This clear 
indication that gross network is very vague to be a precise measure of social capital.   
  
Table 8 Mean number of networks by nature of network 
 Own market Other market 
Location Gross Information Loan Gross Information Loan 
Alemata 20.75 10.5 5.25 13.42 6.33 2.42 
Maychew 16.15 4.23 3.92 16.85 5.62 4.46 
Mokone 14.8 8.9 5.2 17.7 10.3 5.5 
Mekelle 34.63 10.38 7.38 13.06 7.81 2.69 
Homera 32.54 10.52 5.74 10.29 7.32 2.43 
All 26.23 9.23 5.63 13.34 7.37 3.2 
 
Traders located in Mekelle, Himora and Alemata are found to be more networked with in 
own market than traders located in either Maychew or Mokone. However the numeric 
difference is more reflected in gross measure of network, i.e. number of traders known by 
the trader. When more precise measures of social capital are used the numeric difference 
is not that big. When social capital on other markets is considered now Traders in 
Maychew and Mokone are observed to have more gross-network than other markets. 
When information sharing networks are considered, however, Maychew traders are 
observed to have the lowest information sharing networks than other market locations. 
Once again Maychew is observed to have more micro informal lending networks next to 
Mokone. As before there is huge diversity among locations in terms of gross and 
information network than in terms of one day loan network. The implication is that 
having 2 to 5 traders which can lend you in kind or cash in different locations and 5 to 9 
traders which can share information with you are fundamental for having functional 
business.   
 
Since capital is the most important asset among grain traders, it can have far reaching 
impact on structure of grain trade. For given capital, social capital is also an important 
conduct parameter which can have significant influence on structure. That is why their 
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 Study in Ghana by Overa (2006) did found that due to erosion of macro and meso level trust traders are 
observed to be highly dependent on micro networks and this is found to be the case in this study.    
25
 More refinement and variables are developed but will not be reported in this paper for brevity  
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interaction is analyzed using simple correlation coefficient given below. Studies did 
found that the relationship between social capital and wealth is complex and is dependent 
on local realities. In simple words there can be positive association in some locations 
(Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007; Fafchamps and Minten, 1999a and Glaeser et al, 1999, 
2000) and negative association in other locations (Barr, 2000 and McMillan and 
Woodruff, 1998). If all traders in all locations are considered together the association 
between any network measure and capital is less than 4% and none of the correlations are 
significant at 10% level (see table 9, below). So capital does not seem to be a very 
important factor for development of social capital.   
 
Table 9 Simple correlation (r) between current capital and different measures of social capital 
Variable  Alemata Maychew Mokone Mekelle Homera All 
Information own -0.28 0.4 0.3 -0.02 0.13 0.09 
Information other 0.17 0.68** -0.29 -0.01 0.1 0.04 
loan own -0.55* 0.33 0.65** 0.04 -0.03 0.03 
loan other -0.33 0.34 0.15 -0.22 -0.07 -0.18 
Gross own -0.24 0.58** 0.26 -0.15 0.18 0.08 
Gross other -0.05 0.45 -0.21 0.09 0.72*** 0.18 
Note -  * = significant at 10%, ** = significant at 5% and  ***  = significant at 1% 
 
If there were meso level trust among the rich traders we could expect capital to be 
positively associated with social capital at market level. However at market level such 
development is not observed with some noticeable exceptions. The exceptions are the 
following. In Maychew rich traders seem to have more information network in other 
markets and tend to know more people in own market. But this is not observed to 
generate them any preferential access to loan. In Himora the only advantage rich trader 
has is simply related to his/her capacity to know more people in distance market, which is 
not translated toward better access to credit or information. And in Alemata actually the 
poor trader has better access to short term loan than rich trader. The only visible some 
form of concentration of power is observed in Mokone. In this market rich traders have 
more loan networks than poor traders. In general capital by itself does not seem to be a 
very important variable in explaining the development of social capital, with out 
controlling other variables.  
 
Entry, experience and inter generational links in grain trade 
 
Experience in grain trade is very fundamental for success. Through long years of 
experience not only trading skills are learned but also reputation is built to have low 
transaction cost based on trust or social capital. Moreover social capital can be inherited 
from generation to generation, if there is strong meso level social capital.  As can be seen 
from figure 1, below, most of the traders have experience of 10 and less years. Means 
most business are established after the establishment of the Transactional Government of 
Ethiopia in 1991.     
 
However some traders did have more than 40 years of experience as can be shown from 
the positively skewed bar graph and Kernal density given in figure 1, above. So lets use 
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median and mode in addition to mean to have clear picture of the average experience 
observed in each market (see table 10, below). 
 
Figure 1Distribution of experience 
 
 
      
Table 10 Summery measures of experience in grain trade  
Location Mean Median mode Absolute measure of skewness 
Alemata 14.83333 10 10 4.833333 
Maychew 8.153846 6 6 2.153846 
Mokone 13.35714 10.5 10 2.857143 
Mekelle 13.27778 12 12 1.277778 
Himora 18.3125 23 26 -4.6875 
All 14.57895 11 26 3.578947 
 
The southern markets of Maychew, Mokone and Alemata on average are observed to 
have the least experienced traders. A location with least experienced traders is Maychew. 
In Alemata and Mokone the modal trader is working in grain trade for the last 10 years. 
The relative figure for trader from Maychew is just 6 years.  Mekelle traders on average 
tend to have 12 to 13 years of experience. In case of Himora on average traders have an 
experience ranging from 23 to 26 years. However the mean is affected by entry of new 
traders to decline to ward 18 years. So only in Himora are traders found with experience 
of working in more than one regime. Other important factor about Himora is that new 
traders seem to have strong entry, in to this market; which backs the above conclusion 
that there is strong pull factor working in Himora.     
 
Table 11, below, shows the fact that almost all traders are first generation traders, in 
contrary to findings in other markets of developing economies (Fafchamps and Minten, 
1999a) and Ethiopia (Gabre-Madhin, 2001b; Gabre-Madhin et al, 2003).  Means trading 
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business is not something inherited from generation to generation in Tigray grain market. 
This is clear evidence for absence social capital at meso level.  
 
Table 11 Proportion of first generation traders and traders who start their business legally 
Location First generation traders Traders who start with license 
Alemata 0.94 0.18 
Maychew 1 0.46 
Mokone 1 0.21 
Mekelle 1 0.61 
Himora 0.97 0.68 
All 0.98 0.47 
 
Focusing on legal entry most traders, 53%, actually start without license and will slowly 
establish their business to have license. Most of the informal starters are located in 
Southern surplus producing part of Tigray. As was stated above most none grain traders 
are observed even to have grain trading license to access bank credit. This is clear 
indication of easy entry to grain market widely observed in many studies, though easy 
entry is highly the case for traders located in Southern Tigray. We can take Minten and 
Kyle (1999) study of former Zaire grain market, Barrett (1997) study of Madagascar 
grain market and Gabre-Madhin (2001b) study of Ethiopia grain market, as good 
examples. However this does not take effective entry in to grain market and study by 
Barrett (1997) did show that even though there is easy entry in Madagascar grain market, 
entry to the profitable niche market is constrained by lack of social networks and capital. 
The same finding is observed in Ethiopia grain market by Gabre-Madhin (2001b). So 
mere entry and effective entry need to be taken differently. It may be easy to inter in to 
grain market; but it will take years before they can build their own micro network and 
develop experience to be competitive.  
 
Table 12 Percentage of trades with family tradition of engaging in grain trade 
location 
Traders who have family or friend 
engaged in grain trade before them 
Traders who work as 
family worker in trade 
Those who 
think it is vital 
Alemata 0.17 0.17 0.44 
Maychew 0.15 0.15 0.23 
Mokone 0.21 0.07 0.57 
Mekelle 0.28 0.28 0.56 
Himora 0.5 0.44 0.86 
All 0.31 0.26 0.58 
 
As can be seen from table 12, above, most traders, except those located in Maychew and 
Alemata, did think that having friend and family working in grain trade is vital for 
success at the start. This is in line with theoretical and empirical conclusion Fafchamps 
and Minten (1999a) and Greif (1993). That is why analyzing engagement of relatives and 
friends in grain trade will help us to understand enter-generational dynamics of social 
capital and experience. More than 30% of the traders, which mostly are located in 
Himora and to some extent in Mekelle and Mokone, did have family and friend before 
them engaged in grain trade. Actually 26% of all traders, mostly located in Himora and 
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Mekelle, use to work as family worker in grain trade before they start their own business. 
So even though inter generational social capital and trading experience was not inherited 
from one generation to another within the same generation social capital and trading 
skills were transmitted from one family member to another, to some extent. This is 
mainly the case in Himora and Mekelle and to some extent in Mokone, too.        
 
Source of information and level of risk taking 
 
The efficiency of marketing system is related to its decentralized and efficient 
information processing capacity (Hayek, 1945). That is why reliable source of 
information is fundamental for efficiency of market economy. Stiglitz, 2001 did clearly 
summarize result of decades work with in information economics by saying that market 
allocation under imperfect information can be Pareto optimal not by default, but only by 
chance. One way or another, adequate information is necessary for efficiency of the 
marketing system. At this point sources of different information will be identified and 
their quality will be dealt in next sup section.        
 
The most important source of information about own market price is own observation 
(68.6%) and other traders (22.9%).  Other source of information including brokers are not 
that mach important for collecting information on own market. However for distance 
market locations price information is mainly discovered from brokers (40%) followed by 
distant traders (34.12%). This is consistence with Fafchamps and Minten (1999a) finding 
in Madagascar and Gabre-Madhin et al (2003) finding in Ethiopia. In both studies the 
most important source of information is found to be traders’ network than the mass 
media.    
 
Table 13 Main source of information on different market parameters 
Source of information 
Price in 
own 
market 
Price in 
other 
markets 
production 
at national 
level 
Government 
policy and 
regulation 
International 
grain price 
Traders in own market 22.09 5.88 5.88 3.53 1.18 
Traders in other market 0 34.12 7.06 7.06 0 
Brokers in own market 6.98 0 1.18 0 0 
Brokers in other market 0 40 4.71 2.35 0 
Mass media 0 7.06 55.29 50.59 35.29 
own observation 68.6 5.88 9.41 0 4.71 
Other 2.33 2.35 3.53 7.06 1.18 
I don’t have any source 0 4.71 12.94 29.41 57.64 
 
For production at national level and government policy and regulation more than 50% of 
all the traders are primarily informed by the mass media. The rest of the traders are either 
observed to collect information form fragmented source or are not observed to have any 
information source. The least available information is international grain price in which 
more than 57% of traders did claim they did not have any source of information on 
international grain price. However more than 35% of the traders, which are mostly coffee 
and sesame traders, are using mass media as source of international price information. 
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Even though the qualities of information provided by different sources have to be 
evaluated below, there is clear evidence showing the existence of serious lack of 
information in some parameters. Information on international grain price, government 
policy and regulation, national production data and other market locations price are not 
accessed by 58%, 29%, 13% and 5% of traders, respectively.                
 
Facing the above structure, an important behavior of traders is reflected in their 
willingness to take risk as reflected in relative risk premium given in table 14 and 15, 
below. To get result given in table 14, traders are asked how much they will expect to get 
in order to invest 10 000 birr for 3 months in their current situation. The risk premium is 
calculated as the difference between expected value minus 10 000 and the relative risk 
premium is calculated as ratio of the above difference to 10000. For three months to take 
risk most of the traders (68% of all traders) demanded 50% to 100% risk premium. 
Highest risk taking behavior is observed in Mokeone and Alemata, where 58% and 35% 
of the traders, respectively, were willing to assume the risk for risk premium less than 25 
to 10% of the value. The most risk averase individuals are observed in Maychew, Himora 
and Mekelle, respectively, in which only less than 8% of traders in each marekt are 
observed to assume risk for risk premium of less than or equal to 25%.         
 
Table 14 Percentage of traders who demand a given amount of risk premium to take risk for 3 months  
Location  
Relative risk premium rate for 3 months 
10% 25% 50% 100% 200% 
Alemata 0.35 0 0.41 0.18 0.06 
Maychew 0 0 0.69 0.23 0.08 
Mokone 0.33 0.25 0.17 0.17 0.08 
Mekelle 0.07 0 0.4 0.33 0.2 
Homera 0 0.04 0.29 0.46 0.21 
All 0.14 0.05 0.38 0.3 0.14 
 
When the time period is extended into two years 65% of all traders are not willing to 
assume the risk for what ever premium. Most of these traders are located in Maychew 
(100%), Homera (96%) and Mekelle (67%). Again Alemata and Mokeone traders are 
observed to take more risk than traders in other locations. 
 
Table 15 Percentage of traders who demand a given amount of risk premium to take risk for 2 years 
Location  
Relative risk premium rate for 2 years 
25% 50% 100% 200% Never 
Alemata 0.06 0.06 0.35 0.35 0.18 
Maychew 0 0 0 0 1 
Mokone 0 0.08 0.17 0.42 0.33 
Mekelle 0 0 0.2 0.13 0.67 
Homera 0 0 0.04 0 0.96 
All 0.01 0.02 0.15 0.16 0.65 
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So for most traders, grain trading is high turn over business. This is because it is highly 
risky to contemplate about grain price behind few months
26
. This is clear indication of 
high variability of grain price from time to time and from year to year. This is in sharp 
contrast to finding of Gabre-Madhin (2001b)
27
 in Ethiopian grain market. But it is 
consistent with conclusion of Gabre-Madhin et al (2003). In short grain trading in surplus 
producing zone of Tigray is risky, indeed. Given the above structure and associated 
conduct of traders, it is time to focus on the performance of the market.   
 
Market performance 
 
The basic assumption in institutional economics is that unless the market is right, getting 
price to suboptimal ‘right’ level is fatal activity. Before price can get right, the market it 
self needs to get right (Gabre-Madhin et al, 2003). That is why performance is measured 
here by both quality of market inputs and market out comes. Means part of the 
performance is related to market structure and conduct, which can have serious effect on 
market development.      
 
Service of brokers 
  
An important institutional development to deal with high search cost and contract 
enforcement is the development of brokers. Traders are asked if the service provided by 
brokers is adequate to their need. The result is given in table 16, below. If traders are not 
using service provided by broker the assumption is that they don’t need broker service, 
given the broker charge they have to pay. To such traders zero value is given. If they are 
using broker service, they are asked to rank the quality of service in range of 0 to 10.    
 
Table 16 Proportion of traders who are satisfied with service provided by brokers  
Location In own market in other market 
Alemata 0.375 1 
Maychew 0 1 
Mokone 0.133333 0.8 
Mekelle 0.272727 0.846154 
Homera 0.807692 0.923077 
All 0.463768 0.910448 
 
Significant majority of traders (more than 91% of the traders) are satisfied with service 
provided by brokers in distance markets. The least satisfied traders are located in Mokone 
(20%), Mekelle (15%) and Homera (8%). In Alemata and Maychew not a single trader 
was founded to be dissatisfied with service provided by broker in distance market. 
However when we come to local markets most trades, except in Homera, are found to be 
dissatisfied with service provided by brokers. In Maychew not a single trader is found to 
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 This is the most common answer observed when personal discussion are done with grain traders in 
location  
27
 Based on this study grain trading is neither risky nor rewarding activity.   
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use the service of brokers. In both Mokone and Mekelle only 13% and 27% of the 
traders, respectively, are found to be satisfied with service provided by the broker. In 
Alemata 37.5% of the traders are satisfied with service of local brokers, which is close to 
the average satisfaction probability of 46% observed among all traders. However this 
average is mainly affected by extremely higher satisfaction observed among Himora 
traders. So in Ethiopian grain market and excluding Himora the most important service of 
traders is in facilitating distance trade. This is in line with aforementioned fact that most 
traders did not use brokers for price information in own market, but only in distance 
market. This is consistent with low level of meso trust found in Homera and Maychew. 
But in Maychew lack of strong and vibrant grain market is behind the low use of broker 
service in own market. Since the number of traders is small and they are concentrated in 
small market place, the use of broker to reduce search cost is not economic. Quality here 
has to be understood in terms of value added that can be generated by using broker.                       
 
More than lack of satisfaction, it is important to understand which areas are brokers being 
very useful and in which areas they are becoming less functional. The result of such 
analysis is given in table 17 below.  The search service provided by brokers is the one 
area which is provided more or less adequately by brokers in all locations with average 
satisfaction of 79.5%.  The next services of brokers which are ranked the next good 
service provided are enforcement of agreed contract (75.6%) and identifying trust worthy 
traders to have contract with (66.4%).  
 
Table 17 Traders average grade given to different service of Brokers (10 is the best and 0 the worst) 
Brokers service Alemata Maychew Mokone Mekelle Himora all 
Searching a buyer or a seller 8.71 7.31 8.87 7.6 7.46 7.95 
Enforcing contract between contracting 
parities 7.65 6.62 7.8 8.47 7.31 7.56 
Identify trustworthy grain traders 7.12 6.31 7.07 6.53 6.73 6.77 
Being reliable witness on contract 
dispute 6.94 6.08 6.07 7.4 6.62 6.64 
Disperse reliable information 6.18 6 5.8 7.53 6 6.27 
Collection of adequate price and quantity 
information 5.71 6 6 7.13 6.31 6.23 
Being reliable 5.65 6.38 6 7.07 5.96 6.16 
Charging fair fee 3.88 6.31 5.13 8.87 5.85 5.93 
Facilitating good storage facility in other 
locations 4 5.77 4.13 3.2 3.42 3.98 
Providing short term credit 2.47 0 3.8 2.6 3.69 2.72 
Buying and/or selling as your 
representative on other market locations 4.06 0 3.87 0.27 1.38 1.94 
Buying and/or selling as your 
representative on own market 3.18 0 2.4 0.53 1.15 1.49 
 
On average the least quality services provided by brokers is related to their incapability to 
serve as the traders’ agent in local and distance market. This is clear indication that the 
level of trust that exists among traders and brokers is very low. Traders may try to use the 
service of brokers but they will not trust them to make decisions on their behalf or as 
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their agents. Moreover the brokers are either having access to less capital or having less 
trust on their client traders to provide adequate short term credit to the traders
28
. In 
general it is clear from the above result that most serious challenge of the trader and 
broker relationship is that the lack of mutual trust among them. In the middle of the two 
extremes the medium quality service provided by brokers is related to collection and 
dissemination of information, charging fair fee, being reliable on doing business and 
facilitating storage facility in other locations. Again some of these variables are somehow 
related to public good of information. Information collection can be much efficient, if 
there were strong social capital, which can reduce the negative effect of moral hazard to 
be free rider. The result shows that even though the collection and distribution of reliable 
information is not done perfectly, but it is not one of the worst services provided by the 
brokers. This can explain why traders use brokers for information in distance but not 
local market, where the opportunity cost of information collection is relatively low.       
 
In general brokers are good in searching buyer or seller in short time, facilitating and 
enforcing contracts. However this is done in low trust environment. There are some 
variations on the ranking of these services from location to location. But the general trend 
is the same in most locations (see table 17 above).   
 
Storage service 
 
Another important service that traders need to function properly is that good storage 
facility. 60% of the traders think that the storage service provided in their market is 
having acceptable quality to their need. The exception traders are found in Alemata and 
Mokone, in which only less than 27% of their traders think they have good quality and 
adequate storage service at their market. In other markets 80% or more of traders in each 
location do think they have good storage facility in their market which is adequate to 
their need.  
 
Table 18 Proportion of traders who are satisfied with storage service 
Location In own market in other market 
Alemata 0.235294 0.470588 
Maychew 0.846154 1 
Mokone 0.266667 0.666667 
Mekelle 0.8 0.769231 
Homera 0.807692 1 
All 0.604651 0.75 
 
Even if we take storage facility provided in other locations less traders located in Alemata 
(47%) and Mokone (67%) are satisfied with storage service provided in other locations. 
Higher satisfaction is observed Maychew and Homera, in which 100 % of the traders are 
satisfied with storage service provided in distance locations. Mekelle’s distance market’s 
storage service satisfaction rate is around average or 77% when the average of all 
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 This is clear contradiction to  Gabre-Madhin et al (2003) finding in Addis Ababa grain market  
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locations satisfaction rate is 75%. This is in line with poor storage facility available in 
these locations as mentioned above. The exception being Maychew while large number 
of traders did not own storage facility, the availability of few rentable good storage 
facilities in the market to serve the few available traders was generating this result. 
Consultancy with Maychew traders did make it clear than lack of access to finance and 
storage (see table 19) are the most serious problems to market development in the city.              
 
Again the important question is: which part of the storage service is having serious 
problem. Lack of access to land to build storage facility and lack of own storage facility 
are the most two serious problems faced by traders in all locations (see table 19, below). 
Lack of access to land is the most serious problem in Mekelle, Alemata and Maychew, 
respectively. It is less serious in both Himora and Mokone, respectively. Lack of own 
storage is not serious problem in Mekelle and Homera, but it is somehow serious in other 
markets located in South surplus producing zone of Tigray.            
 
Table 19  Traders average grade given to different storage related services (10 is the best and 0 the 
worst) 
 
Kind of service  Alemata Maychew Mokone Mekelle Himora all 
Low spoilage of grain 5.8 9.23 6.4 8.67 8.5 7.79 
Good quality rentable storage 6 8.77 5.6 8.73 8.54 7.63 
Reliable supply of storage facility 6.07 8.77 5.93 8.87 8.04 7.57 
Fair charge for using storage 5.67 8.77 5.33 8.33 7.31 7.07 
Adequate own storage 4.67 1.92 3.87 8.13 8.31 5.85 
Easy access to land to build storage 1.67 2.15 3.07 0.47 5 2.81 
 
The good side of current storage facility is that there is low spoilage of grain which can 
be partially related to high turnover of grain than good quality storage as such. And 
traders in most location agree that there is good quality rentable storage and its supply is 
adequate to their demand. It is important to note that the expectation of traders is shaped 
by their constraints and their action is modified by the expectations. So their expectation 
can be very low that is leading to satisfaction on current level of poor storage and 
contemporary way of doing business, i.e. low temporal arbitration.  
 
Unfair storage charges are not found to be serious problem in Mekelle and Maychew
29
 
but are the next serious problem observed in other markets. In general the most serious 
problem of traders is related to lack of access to build own storage or buy own storage 
facility. However most traders seem to think the quality and quantity of current storage 
service supplied in the market is adequate to their current need. 
 
Quality of Information 
    
The next focus of analysis is the quality of information available to micro decision 
makers in each market. The most reliable information found in the hand of traders is local 
                                                 
29
 This can explain higher satisfaction of traders in May Chew despite their lack of own storage facility  
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market grain price which is mostly discovered by traders own observation and through 
information sharing between other local traders (See table 20, above). The next reliable 
information is grain price discovered in distance market locations. This information is 
mainly shared by distance information network of traders and distant brokers. 
 
Table 20 Traders average grade given to different type of information (10 is the best and 0 the worst) 
 
Information type Alemata Maychew Mokone Mekelle Homera All only users 
Price in own market 9.41 9.23 9.6 9.71 8.85 9.29 9.29 
Price in other markets 8.35 8.15 8.8 8.64 8.27 8.42 8.84 
production at national level 2.94 8 2.4 7.36 7.62 5.78 6.64 
Government policy and 
regulation 1.82 6.62 2.8 6.57 5.5 4.64 6.57 
International grain price 0.35 0.69 2 6 3.85 2.69 6.35 
 
Information which is shared by mass media and other miner sources like production 
information at national level, government policy and regulation and international grain 
price are areas where there is serious information problem. These problems are very 
serious in Alemata and Mokone. However in Maychew and Homera lack of access to 
international price is the only most serious problem and the other two are not that serious. 
In case of Mekelle the information problem in all dimensions is not as serious as other 
markets. In general the most serious problem is related to national and international 
public goods and the distribution of such information by mass media is not found to be 
adequate and reliable in mind of most traders in the region. This is consistent with finding 
by Gabre-Madhin et al (2003) for most Ethiopian grain markets.         
 
Compound growth rate of capital 
 
The performance of grain markets can be also analyzed using average compound annual 
growth rate of traders’ capital as given in table 21, below. Since the distribution of 
growth rate is observed to be positively skewed, it is better to use median than mean 
growth as measure of average. The highest annual nominal growth rate was observed in 
Mokone which is as high as 49% per annum. This is followed by Alemata (35%) and 
Maychew (33%), which are markets located in surplus producing part of Southern 
Tigray.  Not only traders in Southern part of Tigray are having high profit, but also in two 
out of the three markets all traders were having 13% or more compound growth rate of 
capital per annum. The exception being in Alemata where some traders experienced 
decline in nominal capital.       
 
Table 21 summery statistics of nominal compound growth rate of capital for different markets 
location  mean median Absolute skewness Maximum Minimum 
Alemata 0.43 0.35 0.08 1.25 -0.06 
Maychew 0.7 0.33 0.37 2.13 0.13 
Mokone 0.53 0.49 0.04 1.53 0.25 
Mekelle 0.27 0.21 0.06 0.62 0.05 
Himora 0.27 0.16 0.11 1.29 0.05 
all 0.4 0.31 0.09 2.13 -0.06 
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The worst compound growth rate is observed in Himora with 16% per annum and 
Mekelle with 21% per annum. In both markets the lowest growth rate experienced by any 
trader is 5% per annum. On average the median growth rate for all location is 31% per 
annum, in which some traders did face a decline of 6% per annum and some did 
experience annual growth of 213%. This can give us an impression that Southern markets 
are more profitable and attractive markets than other locations and trades are having very 
high profit, if taken at face value. But there are two important issues that need to be 
understood to understand the real picture.        
 
Table 22 Average statistics on capital and year in business  
location 
Mean Median 
Initial capital Current capital Year in business Initial capital Current capital Year in business 
Alemata 19375.88 714539.2 14.41 3000 201200 10 
Maychew 16123.08 230800 8.23 6000 158800 6 
Mokone 4042.86 188852.9 12.5 1250 117185 11 
Mekelle 91973.33 2760227 12 95000 600270 11 
Himora 106333.9 1202371 13.23 139500 527000 16 
 
First, table 22, above, clearly shows that average initial capital needed to start business in 
Southern markets is very low compared to Mekelle and Himora. Ignoring the mean which 
is sensitive to extreme values (which is also showing the same result as median), an 
average trader needs 1250 to 6000 birr to start grain trade in Southern Tigray. Means the 
traders are starting as retailers and slowly growing in to whole sellers. But once they have 
adequate capital they can establish their business as whole seller either in their own 
market or in other important regional markets like Mekelle and Himora. More over the 
absolute growth of capital is very large in Mekelle and Himora than other markets. So the 
reason why there is high compound growth rate in Southern markets is because they are 
starting from very low initial level not because these markets are more successful than 
other markets. Actually traders from Sothern markets will only have chance to participate 
in the lucrative Mekelle and Himora market, if they become successful in their Southern 
trade, which demands less initial capital.      
 
Second, compared to result from many countries the above growth rate is very high. This 
may give us a wrong impression that grain trade is very lucrative business. However this 
is wrong due to two reasons. First there is sample selection bias. If a trader is facing loss, 
there is high chance he/she will exit and will not be included in the sample. However this 
is common bias to all studies, which can result on over estimation of capital growth rate 
among traders in all studies. The second important factor is the impact of unprecedented 
high inflation observed between 2006 and 2009. Just to give a birds eye view of the 
inflation, just imagine teff which is use to be sold for 300 birr before 2006 is now sold 
around 1000 to 1200 birr. It is 200 to 300% growth in Teff price. The implication is that 
to buy 100 quintal Teff you need 30, 000 birr at 2005 but at 2010 you will need 100, 000 
to 120, 000 birr. In short 100, 000 to 120, 000 in 2010 is equal in real value to 30, 000 
birr in 2005. However if we take nominal growth rate of the same purchasing power, it 
will turn out to be 27 to 32% annual growth rate. In short the high growth rate observed 
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among grain trader is related to high inflation and decline in purchasing power than fast 
growth of real capital of traders
30
.  
 
If there were fast growth of traders’ capital we should observed intergenerational 
inheritance of trading business and social capital, which is not observed in the study sites. 
Moreover most grain traders may be using relatives to help them with trade; but only 
very small minorities are allowing their nuclear family to participate in grain trade. This 
another indirect indicator that grain trading business is not taken as important future 
occupation of the family by many traders or its not that profitable compared to the next 
best alternative. This is consistent with finding by Gabre-Madhin (2001b) which shows 
grain trading is not that rewarding activity.    
 
Dimension of temporal Arbitration 
 
The focus on above mentioned parameters is to measure the development of market it self 
and to see how much the market needed to get right. The performance of grain trade can 
be also, however, analyzed by the period of time in which traders are willing and able to 
arbitrate price differentials. The longer is the span of temporal arbitration the more 
efficient the market will be. In Table 23, below, for each trader a maximum amount of 
days that any grain can be hold for temporal arbitration is requested and the summery 
statistics at market level is given. Since the data is skewed mostly to the right and some 
times to the left, it is better to use median as measure of central tendency than mean. So 
the focus will be on median than mean, though any one interested can find the mean 
given in the table.  
 
Table 23 Period of temporal Arbitration among grain traders   
Location mean median Absolute Skewness maximum  minimum 
Alemata 54 30 
14 
120 
 
21 
Maychew 23 30 
-7 
60 
 
0 
Mokone 52 45 
7 
120 
 
1 
Mekelle 79 30 
49 
800 
 
0 
Himora 70 60 
10 
200 
 
0 
all 58 30 
28 
800 
 
0 
 
The longest temporal arbitration is observed in Himora with Median arbitration period of 
60 days or 2 months.  The next location with longer span of arbitration is found to be 
Mokone with period of 1 month and 15 days, while the median temporal arbitration in 
other locations is extended only to one month. It is true some traders are storing grain up 
800 days which is close to 3 years. But these are exceptions while most traders are 
concentrating in short term trade with high turn over. Similar results are observed by 
                                                 
30
 It would be informative, if the analysis is done on real capital but it was not possible to find reliable 
inflation data extending 30 to 40 years.   
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Fafchamps and Hill (2008) in their study of Uganda coffee market, Fafchamps and 
Minten (1996b) study of Madagascar grain market and Gabre-Madhin etal (2003) study 
of Ethiopian grain makret. This is consistent with high risk aversion observed among 
traders and serious market failures that they face in doing their business.      
 
However a word of caution is in order in interpreting the above result. Before few months 
some traders were accused of holding grain to manipulate grain prices. Temporal 
arbitration is a natural activity of traders, which is taken as some thing evil by the 
authorities. So some traders were intentionally biasing the period of their temporal 
arbitration, to avoid possible future action by the authority. The logical conclusion is that 
there is tendency for down ward bias on the period of temporal arbitration due to fear of 
misguided state action in grain market; however given the high risk aversion observed 
among traders, before hand, the bias is not expected to be that big. One way or another, 
the grain market is not that efficient in creating time utility.    
 
Dimension of spatial Arbitration 
 
Another important service provided by grain traders is the creation of space utility. One 
way to crudely measure the efficiency of such activity is to consider how many 
kilometers are traders moving to arbitrate price differential in space or to create space 
utility.          
 
Table 24 Span (distance) of space utility created by traders   
 Location 
mean Median maximum 
Demand 
market 
Supply 
market 
Demand 
market 
Supply 
market 
Demand 
market 
Supply 
market 
Alemata 166 525 183 492 570 842 
Maychew 1 375 0 512 18 632 
Mokone 183 332 139 500 1084 620 
Mekelle 14 537 0 708 115 1025 
Himora 201 80 0 0 991 253 
all 133 319 0 253 1084 1025 
 
On average sampled traders are observed to travel 133 Km to sell grain and 319 KM to 
buy grain (see table 24, above). Maychew and Mekelle traders which are located in net 
importer market are absorbed to be the least important traders in arbitrating price 
differential between their own market and other deficit markets. The maximum distance 
traveled by Mekelle traders to sell their grain is toward Adigrat (115 KM) and the relative 
figure with in Maychew is just 18 KM to ward Mokone. In both markets the average or 
median trader is not expected to travel out of the city to sell grain. However traders in 
Himora, Mokone and Alemata are observed to travel longer mean distance of 201, 183 
and 166, respectively. However a median trader is more probable to move longer distance 
in Alemata than Mokone and Himora. In both markets and mainly in Himora the average 
is affected by few traders’ very long distance trade. In case of Himora a median trader is 
not expected to move out of Himora to sell grain. This can be because the most important 
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grain in the market, sesame, is sold to exporters with in Himora as facilitated by ECX. In 
Mokone the average (median) trader is observed to travel just 139 KMs. The relatively 
lower figure for Mokone is partially related to longer drought observed for the last 2 to 3 
years which was able to reduce the level of grain produced in the area.   
 
In general even though an average Trader is not expected to move out of its market town 
to sell grain with in Tigray, due to high mobility of some traders which can range up to 
1084 KM the average trader is having a mobility of 133 KMs. So spatial arbitration to 
create space utility between own market and distance demand market is not a primary 
task among grain traders with in Tigray.   
 
When we observe traders creation of space utility between surplus markets and own 
market all traders in most markets seem to travel much longer distance. The exception is 
Himora traders, in which an average trade is not expected to have any mobility out of 
market though the mean distance travelled to buy grain is 80 KM. In case of other 
markets higher median mobility which is extended from 492 to 708 Km is observed. The 
mean distance is affected by few traders’ low mobility to be in range of 332 to 537 KMs. 
However still traders seem to have better capacity to arbitrate price differential observed 
between other surplus markets and their own market than their own market and other 
deficit markets. An average (median) trader in all markets is expected to travel 253 KM 
to buy grain against 0 Km to sell grain. 
 
So traders in sampled part of Tigray are travailing longer distance to buy grain than to 
sell grain and this is clear indication that spatial arbitration has improved over time, if we 
take the result by Gabre-Madhin et al (2003) as bench mark.  
 
One important point is that sampled markets do not seem to evolve to ward radial market 
structure proposed as possible structure by Ravallion (1986) or completely integrated 
markets expected in micro theory. It seems traders in each market are travelling to 
surplus or deficit market directly than depending on any central hub say Mekelle. This is 
again a reflection low level of market integration. Even if there is market integration, 
each trader is not adjusting to price differential at each market. Each trader is acting only 
on given space and the over all integration is crated at system level by over all structure 
of the system. The practical implication is that price adjustment in such system will be 
some how less optimal.       
   
Main challenges of grain markets 
 
Before this part is concluded it is important to identify the challenges identified by traders 
themselves in facilitating their activity. A challenge which is stated to be the most 
important one by 44% of all traders is lack of access to finance (see table 25, below). 
This is clear indication that the formal and informal financial markets are not providing 
adequate and cost effective financial liquidity to most traders. This is observed to be a 
much serious problem in Mekelle and Maychew, in which 80% and 67% of traders, 
respectively, stated that the most important challenge in doing their business is lack of 
finance.  This is consistent with early compressive study done in Ethiopia by Gabre-
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Madhin et al (2003). In the other three sites lack of finance as the most important 
challenge is identified by 23 to 40% of the traders.  
 
The second important challenge identified is activity of unlicensed traders which are 
having competitive edge over licensed traders, since they can under cut price to push 
legal traders out of business. Even though 18% of all traders pick this as the most 
important challenge, most of these traders are located in Southern Tigray of Alemata 
(59%), Mokone (20%) and Maychew (8%). This problem is not that serious in Mekelle 
and to some extent in Himora. Another serious challenge identified as the most important 
challenge by 13% of traders is demand uncertainty.  This is clear indication of the high 
price uncertainty that traders are exposed on. However this is a serious problem to 
Himora (31%), Mokone (13) and Mekelle (7%) traders, only.    
         
Table 25 the first most important problem raised by traders for doing their business as percentage of 
all traders 
challenge  Alemata Maychew Mokone Mekelle Homera All 
lack of finance 0.29 0.67 0.4 0.8 0.23 0.44 
lack of storage facility 0.06 0.08 0.2 0 0.04 0.07 
High tax 0 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.19 0.09 
Demand uncertainty 0 0 0.13 0.07 0.31 0.13 
Lack of adequate information 0 0 0 0.07 0.04 0.02 
poor quality roads 0 0 0 0 0.08 0.02 
Unlicensed traders 0.59 0.08 0.2 0 0.04 0.18 
policy uncertainty 0.06 0.08 0 0 0 0.02 
Government bureaucracy  0 0 0 0 0.04 0.01 
Shortage of clean water 0 0 0 0 0.04 0.01 
Total 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
The remaining challenges which are identified as most important by 7% and 9% of 
traders are lack of storage facility and unfairly fixed high taxes, respectively.  The highest 
complain on taxes are observed in Homera (by 19% of traders) and the lowest is in 
Alemata (by 0% of all traders). In other markets 7 to 8% of the traders were complaining 
about unfairly high taxes laid on them. Serious storage problem is observed among 
Mokone traders, in which for 20% of them lack of good quality storage. In terms of 
storage facility none of the Mekelle traders identify it as the most important challenges 
for doing their business. In other locations 4% to 8% of the traders take lack of 
appropriate storage as the most important problem.    
 
In general, for most traders the most important problems that have to be addressed first 
are related to lack of adequate finance, unfair license and tax policy of government, 
demand uncertainty and lack of storage facility, respectively. Excluding lack of access to 
finance the relative importance each problem is found to be market specific. The 
implication is that each market can’t follow the same market development policy, unless 
it is related to finance. The priorities are different in different areas. To improve our 
understanding of the marketing system and its challenges, traders are also allowed to 
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identify second, third and so forth, problems to have a complete menu of the challenges 
observed in each market.                     
 
Table 26 Proportion of traders who identify a given challenge as a problem to them  
 
challenge  Alemata Maychew Mokone Mekelle Homera All 
lack of finance 0.88 1 0.93 1 0.73 0.88 
lack of storage facility 0.59 0.75 0.93 0.47 0.35 0.58 
Demand uncertainty 0.59 0.5 0.53 0.73 0.54 0.58 
Lack of adequate information 0.24 0.67 0.4 0.67 0.65 0.53 
High tax 0.12 0.67 0.4 0.6 0.73 0.52 
Unlicensed traders  0.82 0.5 0.73 0.07 0.31 0.47 
poor quality roads 0.12 0.08 0.4 0.2 0.69 0.35 
policy uncertainty 0.29 0.08 0.4 0.07 0.04 0.16 
Government bureaucracy 0.06 0 0.27 0.2 0.19 0.15 
Collusion by few traders 0.06 0.08 0.33 0.13 0.15 0.15 
Shortage of electric power 0 0 0 0 0.12 0.04 
Shortage of clean water 0 0 0 0 0.08 0.02 
shortage of grain 0 0 0.07 0 0.04 0.02 
  
Even though the priority of each market was found to be different as was stated above, 
table 26, above, clearly show that most of the problems are commonly faced by all 
traders, of course to different extent. The three most important challenges are lack of 
finance, lack of storage facility and Demand uncertainty, which are nominated by 88%, 
58% and 58% of traders to be a problem of the marketing system. The least serious three 
problems identified and which are not actually directly related to the marketing system 
are shortage of water, electric power and grains. These challenges are identified only in 
two markets. 4 to 12% of traders in Himora stated the above three problems and only 7% 
of grain traders in Mokone identified shortage of grain to exchange as a serious problem. 
Following the top three challenges stated above lack of adequate information, unfairly 
high taxes, lack of control on activity of unlicensed traders and poor quality roads are 
identified as a problem by 35% to 53% of all traders. Sluggish and inefficient 
bureaucracy, policy uncertainty and collusion among few dominant traders are not found 
to be the most important challenges as only 15 to 16% of traders were identifying this 
parameters as challenge.  
 
In general most of the challenges stated above are commonly observed in different 
locations reflecting the low level of marketing development achieved in all the sites. 
However due to scarcity of resource, simulations intervention in holistic manner is not an 
option and market development have to be approached in integrated manner. The basic 
idea of integrated development is that: all things that have to be done and can be done 
have to be done simultaneously to achieve success; but every thing can’t be done at the 
same time. So priority areas in each market have to identified and the above result clearly 
shows that the first priority in each market is found to be very different from other 
market, means one shoe may not feet every feet! 
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Cost benefit analysis of services provided or expected to provided by Ethiopian 
Commodity Exchange (ECX) 
 
ECX standard contracts 
 
The Ethiopian Commodity Exchange has developed standard contracts for number of 
commodities. The commodities with well developed contract with in ECX are Coffee 
(ECX, 2009), Sesame (ECX, undated -a ), Red Kindney Beans (ECX, undated -b), white 
pea beans (ECX, undated -c) and Wheat (ECX, undated -d).  In this study contracts of 
three commodities will be taken as basis of analysis. This commodities are coffee (to 
represent it self), sesame (to represent it self) and Wheat (to represent food grains).  
 
For coffee a standard contract includes 30 bags in which each bag of washed coffee is 
equal to 60 KG and for unwashed coffee it is equal to 85 KG. Means one contract 
represent 18 quintal of washed coffee and 25.5 quintal of unwashed coffee. For wheat 
and Sesame one contract is equal to 50 quintals.        
 
For all commodities the Exchange transaction fee is 0.2% of transaction value. However 
there are important differences on the contract specification and costs. The warehouse 
storage charge for wheat is 0.04 birr per quintal per day but grace period is not given. 
Means payment will start at the first data of deposit.  For Sesame and Coffee the storage 
cost is 0.16 birr per bag. For sesame one bag is equal to one quintal but for coffee it 
ranges from 60 KG (for washed coffee) to 85 KG (for unwashed coffee). The implication 
is that for coffee the storage cost per quintal can range from 19 cents per day for 
unwashed to 27 cents per day for washed. For both Coffee and Sesame there is three days 
of grace period.  
 
Another transaction cost is related to handling and product certification fee, which 
includes sampling and grading, weighting, loading and unloading fees. For wheat the 
handling cost to both buyer and seller are 1.45 birr per quintal. These rates are higher for  
Export commodity like coffee and sesame. For sesame buyer will pay 2.6 birr per quintal 
and seller will pay 2.7 birr per quintal. For coffee bag seller is expected to pay 2.7 birr 
and buyer 2.1 birr. Since one coffee bag is 0.6 quintal of washed coffee, for quintal of 
washed coffee a buyer and seller are paying 3.5 and 4.5 birr, respectively. Coffee traded 
in domestic economy is the lowest quality unwashed coffee and for such coffee handling 
cost for buyer and seller are 3.18 birr per quintal and 2.47 birr per quintal, respectively.   
 
For wheat payment is withdrawn from buyer account at trading data and is transferred to 
the seller account next day. Assuming wheat is deposited in warehouse and warehouse is 
issued one day before trading data, it will take 3 working days to sell wheat in ECX. One 
day after trading date, delivery notice will be given to the buyer giving him/her 
instruction how to pick the grain for transportation. After giving pick up notice the grain 
have to be with drawn with in 10 days from trading date. In other words it will take 2 
working days to buy wheat in ECX. The only difference for coffee and Sesame from 
wheat is that payment from buyer account is done one day after trading date than in 
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trading date. So again seller needs minimum of three days and buyer needs minimum of 
two days to complete transaction, according to the contract specification of ECX.     
 
Cost and benefit analysis on ECX transaction service  
 
Search is for contracting trader in own market is mostly done by the owner him self or 
trusted and experienced worker. For distance market and some times in own market 
search process is facilitated by using brokers. Traders do not seem to be highly dependent 
on other workers in the search process
31
. When other workers are used, the workers have 
to be highly trusted by the owner and have to be experienced. This is a reflection of low 
trust in the market or low meso trust. That is why in this study the implicit opportunity 
cost of trusted and experienced worker is taken to be equal to contingent wage attached 
by the owner. The owner is asked: “if some one as experienced and as trust worthy as you 
is to do your job, how much will you pay?” This can serve as implicit wage of trusted and 
experienced workers time. To calculate implicit cost of the owner, weekly working hours 
of the owner and expected working hours of the above stated working hours of 
experienced and trusted manager is used. If owner is working 30 hours per week but 
expect others to work 40 hours, it means there are some important qualities owned by 
him that can’t be found in market. That is why the owner’s implicit wage will be 33% 
more than the manager’s salary. In this study the minimum standard contracts fixed by 
ECX are used. A single standard contract is related to 50 quintal of all commodities 
except coffee. For unwashed coffee a standard contract is related to 25.5 quintal.  For 
ECX the costs are related to, both, exchange cost and handling cost. The relative cost and 
benefit of using ECX’s exchange service are calculated and the associated proportions are 
given below.    
 
Table 27 Proportion of traders who will face high exchange cost than search cost of normal way of 
doing business as buyer   
grain Alemata Maychew Mokone Mekelle Homera All 
Teff 0.75 0 0.75 0.5 1 0.59 
Barley 0.71 1 0.88 0.33 . 0.76 
Wheat . 0.8 1 1 . 0.9 
Sorghum 0.45 0 0.57 1 0.2 0.41 
maize 0.11 0 0.2 0.67 0 0.21 
Chickpea . . 0 . . 0 
Horse Beans . . 1 0 0 0.33 
Lentils . 1 . . 0 0.17 
Sesame . . . . 0.83 0.83 
Millet . 0 1 0 0 0.25 
All 0.51 0.31 0.69 0.44 0.5 0.51 
 
As can be seen from table 27, above, 51% of grains
32
 traded by different traders are 
having low search cost in normal way of doing business than the search cost expected to 
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 The same observation is done in Madagascar grain market by Fafchamps and Minten (1996b) 
32
 This is related to simple proportion with out taking how many quintal the trader is trading  
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be faced in ECX. The worst effect is expected in Mokone followed by Alemata and 
Homera in which 69%, 51% and 50% of the grains are expected to have high search cost, 
if traded with in ECX. Traders and grains in Maychew and Mekelle are expected to have 
more chance of improvement in transaction cost related to search by joining ECX. 69% 
of grains in Maychew and 56% of grains in Mekelle will have low transaction cost by 
being traded in ECX. So most traders in surplus producing markets will face high search 
cost but not most traders in customer centers, if they are traded with in ECX
33
.    
 
Since coffee is traded mostly by traders using ECX and since spatial arbitration behind 
licensed single market is not allowed by law, coffee is omitted in this analysis. 
Commodities which will face serious increase in search cost are Wheat, sesame, Barley 
and Teff, in which 90%, 83%, 76% and 59% of traders, respectively, will face high 
search cost by using ECX. So the most important grains in the regional economy will fail 
to benefit from the transaction service provided by ECX’s. The problem is related to 
ECX’s fee fixation method, which makes fees proportional to value of transaction. As 
result luxury commodities and export items will be charged higher than other 
commodities, for the same transaction service provided by ECX. Moreover export 
commodities like coffee and sesame will face higher handling cost than others, as was 
stated above.   
 
However ECX has some additional advantage that can improve transaction cost. To give 
one example, if traders are buying in ECX, they can have low handling cost. This is 
because of properly defined grade and standards and efficient enforcement of these 
standards with in ECX.  To calculate total cost faced in buying grain with in normal way 
of doing business handling cost (cleaning, sacking, loading, unloading and sack cost) and 
transpiration cost are added to search cost. Some traders claim to have zero sack cost. 
However it is more logical that the sack cost is imputed in the grain price. So the average 
sack cost in the market is used to impute the sack cost for those with zero sack cost.  If 
new sack is purchased for 5 to 7 birr, they tend to sell the second hand sack for 2 to 3 
birr. As result sack cost normally will range from 3 to 4 birr. Other costs are taken as 
reported by the buyer.  
 
For ECX the exchange cost, handling cost and storage cost (paid by seller) are taken at 
face value based on ECX contract. The grain is assumed to be deposited at one day 
before trade date (T-1) and the contract will be completed in one day after trade date (T 
+1). However grains have to be transported from warehouse to the traders’ storage or vise 
verse. To deal with this fact, average transportation cost (among traders who use 
transportation) is found for each market. Then this average transportation cost is added to 
ECX other costs. In Mekelle some traders, for example, buy grain at their storage facility 
and tracks will unload their grain in their store. But if they have to use ECX, they have to 
transport it from warehouse to their storage and this will add to cost. This is why 
transportation cost is taken in to account.          
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 May Chew is deficit market located in surplus producing zone   
55 
 
Table 28 Proportion of traders who will face high transaction cost by using ECX than depending on 
normal way of doing business as buyer  
Grain Alemata Maychew Mokone Mekelle Homera All 
Teff 0.25 1 0.67 0.25 0.67 0.56 
Barley 0.14 0 0.5 0 . 0.24 
Wheat . 0 0.25 0 . 0.1 
Sorghum 0.27 1 0.43 0.67 0 0.24 
Maize 0.11 1 0.2 0.17 0 0.34 
Chickpea . . 0 . . 0 
Horse Beans . . 1 0 0 0.33 
Lentils . 0 . . 0 0 
Sesame . . . . 0.22 0.22 
Millet . 1 1 0 0 0.5 
All 0.21 0.65 0.49 0.22 0.14 0.31 
 
When all costs are taken in to account only 31% of the grains are expected to have high 
transaction cost by using the exchange service of ECX. The least benefit is expected in 
Maychew and Mokone with 65% and 49% of grains, respectively, are expected to face 
high transaction cost after using ECX. Other markets will have fair number of grains 
which will face reduction in transaction cost after using ECX.        
 
In terms of grain excluding Teff and millet large number of traders will have low 
transaction cost by using ECX. The proportion of traders which are going to benefit from 
ECX exchange service range from 66% to 100%, but this does not mean most traders will 
demand ECX exchange service. There are important problems in creating such link. First 
when exchange is turned from personal based on micro trust to ward impersonal based on 
macro trust insiders will have to give up the benefit expected from years of investment on 
networks. Means traders can’t have inside information, cheap and flexible access to credit 
and so on. This will reduce the benefit enjoyed by traders. Second if traders were earning 
abnormal profit with in micro trust, the development of macro trust will erode such 
benefits. Third trading skill learned over years will become less useful and they have to 
learn new way of doing business. This is why low transaction cost of single trading in 
static manner may not be a good indicator of trader acceptance of ECX trading service. 
To deal with this problems contingent values are collected in form of traders willingness 
to pay for using services expected to be supplied by ECX.    
 
Since buyers are not paying storage cost the number of days taken to complete 
transaction with in ECX will not affect the cost they have to face with in ECX. However, 
the contingent price they are willing to pay will decline with increase in duration of 
transaction. If the current process of facilitating exchange in 2 to 3 days for buyers is 
followed only 14% and 26% of traders trading in different grains are willing to pay the 
rate demand for ECX or more (see table, 29 below). If exchange duration is reduced to 
half day or one day, more than 60% of the grains will not be able to trade with in ECX. 
To attract more than 60% of the grains there is need to introduce an exchange system 
which can be completed with in half to one hour. Means than focusing on sophisticated 
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exchange it may be conducive to introduce auction centers, where large number of 
buyers, sellers and brokers are buying and selling based on open outcry. Since most 
traders are satisfied with service provided by the broker and the use of networks can 
counter the expansion of commodity exchange, it is not advisable to start advanced 
commodity exchange with its huge over head costs. The main problem of traditional 
exchange is related to low trust, in adequate information, high risk and high search cost. 
So there is a need for efficient price discovery with low search cost. There is a need to 
inject trust on the system and there is a need to introduce public dissemination of 
efficiently discovered prices. This needs a simple and centralized auction floor as was the 
case in most Central and Eastern Europe commodity exchanges at the start (UNCTAD, 
2005).         
 
Table 29 Sensitivity of proportion of trader as buyers who are expected to lose from ECX for 
duration of transaction by location  
 Location 3 days 2 days 1 day 1/2 day 1 hour 1/2 hour 
Alemata 0.85 0.74 0.64 0.62 0.08 0.13 
Maychew 0.58 0.35 0.19 0.15 0 0 
Mokone 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.79 0.74 0.72 
Mekelle 0.85 0.7 0.7 0.59 0.41 0.37 
Homera 0.94 0.78 0.78 0.76 0.56 0.56 
All 0.86 0.74 0.7 0.62 0.39 0.39 
 
Better demand for such commodity exchange is expected in Maychew, Alemata and 
Mekelle, respectively, but not in Mokone and Himora. Coffee, Sesame and Teff traders 
which are trading in export and luxury commodities will face the highest transaction cost 
since these commodities will end up being charged higher. However normal and inferior 
commodities will have higher demand, unless the exchange institutions and rates are 
altered (see table 30, below). That is why it is advisable that the current rates used in 
ECX need to be modified, if they are to attract luxury items like white teff. In normal 
way of doing business flat rates are used for most grains that make rich traders activity in 
luxury and high priced commodities very profitable. So some middle rate between ECX 
rates and normal practice need to be developed for luxury items.   
    
Table 30 Sensitivity of proportion of trader as buyer who are expected to lose from ECX for duration 
of transaction by grain 
grain 3 days 2 days 1 day 1/2 day 1 hour 1/2 hour 
Teff 0.87 0.77 0.72 0.64 0.46 0.46 
Barley 0.81 0.71 0.67 0.57 0.38 0.38 
Wheat 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.4 
Sorghum 0.86 0.7 0.65 0.65 0.24 0.27 
Maize 0.79 0.55 0.48 0.38 0.07 0.07 
Chickpea 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Horse Beans 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.33 0 0 
Lentils 1 1 0.83 0.83 0.17 0.17 
Sesame 0.96 0.91 0.91 0.87 0.91 0.91 
Coffee 1 1 1 1 1 0.88 
Millet 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.25 0 0 
All 0.86 0.74 0.7 0.62 0.39 0.39 
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The logical conclusion is that: first, if traders are given the current exchange products 
related to transaction as it is, they may not have large demand for service that can be 
provided by ECX. However, if the products of ECX are able to take a middle ground, 
where the personal exchange and network efficiency is improved by introducing simple 
auction centers which can facilitate exchange with in ½ to 1 hour, there could be 
significant improvement on current marketing system.  
     
Cost and benefit analysis expected warehouse receipt service of ECX  
 
Now let’s focus on warehouse receipt system that is expected to be extended to grain 
trade. For food grains the monthly storage cost with in ECX is 0.04 per month per quintal 
or 1.2 birr per month. However an average trader is willing to pay 2.5 birr to 5.84 birr per 
month per quintal to store grain in modern storage of ECX. However the relative figure 
for unwashed coffee is 5.7 birr and for sesame it is 4.8 birr. This may reduce the demand 
of modern warehouse by coffee and sesame traders operating in domestic economy than 
internal market.    
 
Table 31 summery statistics of contingent willingness to pay for monthly use of ECX warehouse   
Contingent statistics mean median 
Payment for Simple storage service 5.84 2.5 
Payment for storage service with tradable receipt  6.95 3 
Payment for storage service with credit and tradable receipt  11.01 4 
 
If the warehouse receipt can be used as unit of account in exchange determining the 
quantity and quality of grain stored in certified warehouse that can be exchanged, the 
average traders is willing to pay 3 birr 6.95 birr per month to deposit one quintal in 
warehouse (see table 31, above). When the were house receipt can be also used to access 
warehouse receipt based loan on discount bases, there is dramatic increase in storage cost 
traders are willing to pay to 4 to 11 birr per quintal on average. This is highly consistent 
with the two most important problems raised by traders i.e. lack of access to finance and 
lack of modern storage facility.  However coffee and sesame marketed for domestic 
economy may need to have lower price tags compared to their export counter parts, if 
large numbers of traders are going to be attracted to ECX warehouse and related services 
(see table 32, below).     
 
As can be seen from table 32, below, except for coffee and Sesame most of traders will 
be willing to pay the current rate fixed by ECX to use the modern warehouse service. 
88% of coffee traders in Mekelle and 52% of Sesame traders in Himora are not willing to 
use the simple warehouse service that can be provided by ECX.  In terms of location 49% 
of grain in Mokone may not use the warehouse service that can be provided by ECX. 
This is consistent with low level of storage problem observed in this market. In Mekelle 
except coffee traders all other traders are willing to use the simple modern storage service 
that can be provided by ECX. In Himora close to 40% of the grain which are mostly 
Sesame, Teff and Sorghum may not be able to use the warehouse service provided by 
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ECX. This is partially related to relatively better storage facility in the city and high rate 
fixed against sesame, in case of sesame. 
 
Table 32 Proportion of grain traders which are not willing to pay the storage cost fixed by ECX when 
the use of warehouse receipt is used as receipt of deposit only  
grain Alemata Maychew Mokone Mekelle Homera All 
Teff 0.08 0.13 0.42 0 0.33 0.21 
Barley 0 0 0.63 0 . 0.24 
Wheat . 0.2 0.75 0 . 0.4 
Sorghum 0.18 0 0.43 0 0.33 0.27 
Maize 0.22 0 0.2 0 0 0.1 
Chickpea . . 0 . . 0 
Horse Beans . . 1 0 0 0.33 
Lentils . 0 . . 0.2 0.17 
Sesame . . . . 0.52 0.52 
Coffee . . . 0.88 . 0.88 
Millet . 0 1 0 0 0.25 
All 0.13 0.08 0.49 0.26 0.38 0.29 
 
In over all more than 70 of the grain traded in these markets can be stored in modern 
warehouse receipt as the traders are willing to pay more than what is demanded by ECX. 
If the warehouse receipt can be used as unit of account in transaction or can be used as 
collateral to access bank credit, this will increase to more than 80% (see table 33, below).          
 
Table 33 Proportion of grain traders which are not willing to pay the storage cost fixed by ECX when 
storage receipt can be used for transaction or accessing bank credit or both*  
grain Alemata Maychew Mokone Mekelle Homera All 
Teff 0.08 0.13 0.25 0 0 0.13 
Barley 0 0 0.25 0.33 . 0.14 
Wheat . 0.2 0.25 0 . 0.2 
Sorghum 0.09 0 0.43 0.33 0.07 0.16 
Maize 0.11 0 0.2 0.17 0 0.1 
Chickpea . . 0 . . 0 
Horse Beans . . 0 0 0 0 
Lentils . 0 . . 0 0 
Sesame . . . . 0.43 0.43 
Coffee . . . 0.63 . 0.63 
Millet . 0 0 0 0 0 
All 0.08 0.08 0.26 0.3 0.22 0.19 
* – even though there is decrease in contingent payment when access to credit is taken away it failed 
to change the proportion   
 
This is clear indication that what the domestic commodity traders are looking is not 
modern western style exchange, but some highbred of modern and traditional practice 
where traders can have better access to credit, modern storage, information and low 
transaction cost over normal way of ding business in general. To understand this fact we 
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can take the experience of the Budapest Commodity Exchange of Hungary, which is one 
of the most successful commodity exchanges in Eastern and Central Europe. In this 
exchange a very simple auction center was first established and the exchange is up graded 
over time by using the exchange fee (UNCTAD, 2005).       
 
Conclusion of cost and benefit analysis 
 
In general there are four models of commodity exchanges. There first one is that low 
cost, low service open outcry exchange; the second one is low cost low service electronic 
exchange; the third is high service open outcry exchange and finally high service 
electronic exchange. The first one has been tried in many African countries. But only in 
few case (the coffee and tea auction in east Africa and for some time the Zimbabwe 
Agriculture Commodity Exchange, ZIMACE) have show some success. But even this 
success does not generate enough surpluses to invest on system up grade. The second one 
is also tried by Africanlion, an online coffee exchange in east Africa, which has not yet 
found the path to sustainability. Both are low cost and low service facilities means low 
value added and low fees, which hinder their survival and reach full potential. Model 
three is tried in Alexandria Cotton exchange (Egypt) which is closed 40 years ago, but 
was successful with global participants. Model 4 is used by SAFEX with strong financial 
back up and it is a success story (UNCTAD, 2005). However the researcher believes that 
market development is an important public good that has to be facilitated by government 
intervention. So than starting a complex model 4 type exchange which will not be 
sustainable, it is important to start with model 1 and then up grade it in to 3, 2 and the 4 
with government support. To do that introduction of certified warehouse receipt system 
with credit facility and introduction of semi modern and semi traditional exchange 
centers where grain auction are done may be the right first step to develop modern and 
advanced commodity exchange in the future.  
 
The critical challenge in such process is lack of consistency between modern or 
international grade and standards used in ECX and traditional grade and standards used 
by traders
34
. Since one can’t be imposed on the other and it may take time to integrate the 
best of both ways. In mean time it may not be wise to use clearing house or grade wise 
storage facility to combine similarly graded grains. Under asymmetric information and 
such inconsistency it is not hard to show that such practice will bankrupt the warehouse 
facility in medium and long run. The logical step seems to be to use the structure that has 
been used in old coffee auction. After grade and standard is given for grain of each trader, 
each trader’s grain has to be presented as separate contract in auction and buyers have to 
see and check the sample first hand. So what the exchange is granting is consistency of 
what is sampled and what is in all sacks and is also giving grade and standards as base of 
analysis. The final decision on quality is left on the hand of the buyer who has to see the 
screen the sample before auction. The same applies for using warehouse receipt system. 
With out developing proper grade and standards, the use of warehouse clearing system is 
recipe for disaster. That is why first, traders need to store each grain separately; second, 
banks need to check the quality of grain before hand before giving a discount loan. This 
                                                 
34
 Such in consistency between formal grades used by different organizations and actual grade and standard 
by traders is well documented in Gabre-Madhin et al (2003) study.   
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can create some delay in warehouse receipt system, but it is the only way to avoid 
disaster in face of high inconsistency between domestic informal grades and standard and 
formal grades and standards. This conclusion is inline with observation and believe of 
Gabre-Madhin and Goggin (2005, 12) in saying “There is no blueprint for commodity 
exchange development. They are useful and viable only when tailored to the real needs 
of the country.” In this paper the same cloth is not assumed to fit every one, after 
measuring the dimensions of the market, we are proposing a cloth that can fit.      
  
Determinants of willingness to pay for different services offered or expected to be 
offered by ECX 
 
Determinants of willingness to pay for using warehouse receipt system  
 
Warehouse receipt, which is found to be highly demanded by traders in the site, can have 
three advantages over normal way of doing business. First, it can serve as simple storage 
facility to provide modern and cost effective storage to traders (simple storage service). 
Second, the receipt can serve as unit of account or it can facilitate trade based on 
specification of warehouse receipt (transaction service). This can reduce search cost, in 
particular, and transaction cost, in general. Third the receipt can be used as collateral to 
access short term credit (credit service). In these subsection determinants of traders’ 
willingness to pay for different warehouse related services is analyzed by using simple 
OLS model. In each independent variable 8 observations, 6 from Homera and 2 from 
southern markets, were observed to have zero value. Following the recommendation of 
Maddala (1983) OLS model was fitted, but the observations are found to be outlier in 
many dimensions. So they are excluded from the analysis. One additional outlier is also 
excluded from transaction model to make the observations 84.            
 
Table 34 specification testes to warehouse service related products regressed in OLS    
Parameter/ test 
Simple storage transaction credit 
statistics probability statistics probability statistics probability 
Ramsey reset 1.49 0.227 0.39 0.76 1.64 0.19 
Breusch-Pagan  9.99 0.002 7.16 0.008 0.61 0.43 
IM normality 29.32 0.136 12.33 0.83 18.88 0.399 
F-value 3.49 0.000 113.52 0 337.71 0 
max VIF 4.19  
6.12 
 
2.85 
 
R2 0.54  
0.47 
 
0.44 
 
n 85  
84 
 
85 
 
 
As can be seen from table 34, above, all models are appropriately specified, except for 
heteroskedasticity problem observed in two models and it is dealt by using robust 
standard errors. For brevity, the focus of following analysis will be on model result given 
in table 35, below, than on specification test result, give above, which are easily 
understood by any economist. The variables in table 35, below, are selected based on 
theoretical and statistical bases, though all variables given below and other more are first 
61 
 
fitted in all the models. Insignificant variables which are not theoretically fundamental 
are dropped, if they did not effect specification of the model.     
   
Table 35 Determinants of willingness to pay for different warehouse receipt system products in log from 
Independent variable 
 
Simple storage Transaction  Credit  
Coef. Prob. Coef. Prob. Coef. Prob. 
lnage 0.702 0.193 -0.063 0.568 -0.06 0.556 
Alemata 0.452 0.14 -0.248** 0.035 -0.216** 0.011 
Maychew 1.347*** 0.001 -0.02 0.881 -0.039 0.638 
Mokone 0.001 0.997 -0.236* 0.06 -0.152* 0.054 
Mekelle  0.754 0.169 -0.442*** 0.001 -0.181 0.019 
Less than Grade 3 0.498 0.269 -0.078 0.292 0.056 0.398 
Grade 7 - 8 0.181 0.529 -0.013 0.863 0.055 0.418 
Grade 9 -12 0.274 0.325 0.028 0.696 0.026 0.689 
Post high 0.375 0.237 -0.082 0.325 0.13* 0.076 
Log quality of own storage  0.007 0.759     
Log quality of rentable storage -0.032 0.635     
Log access to land 0.018 0.621     
Log of fair charge 0.191** 0.02     
Log of average easiness to own storage   
-0.004 0.632 0.039 0.14 
Log of average easiness to rent good 
quality at fair rate   
-0.043 0.118 -0.092** 0.035 
Log of current capital 0.1 0.14     
Log of experience  -0.303* 0.08     
Log of gross network in own market  -0.345** 0.028 0.085** 0.036   
Log of storage cost 0.064 0.737     
Log of maximum storage 0.083** 0.01   
-0.008 0.328 
Log of information network in own 
market    
-0.13** 0.025 0.089** 0.03 
Log of loan network in own market   
0.11* 0.05 0.027** 0.025 
Log of search cost   
0.009 0.803 
  
Log of buying cost   
-0.032 0.843 
  
Log of fair charge for none owners -0.133 0.173     
Lack of storage facility  -0.558*** 0.005     
High tax     
0.082 0.101 
Unlicensed traders  -0.395* 0.086   
0.082 0.143 
Constant  -0.715 0.692 0.829 0.189 0.696 0.072 
 
When simple storage model is considered, traders located in Maychew are observed to 
have higher demand for storage service of modern warehouse provider, than others. In 
other locations, the level of demand for modern storage facility is not that significantly 
different from Himora, the control site. It is possible to expect that experienced and well 
connected trader may have less interest in using simple storage service that can be 
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provided by certified warehouse provider. Storage cost does not seem to be an important 
factor in determining traders’ willingness to pay for modern storage service; however 
traders which are having longer span of temporal arbitration are more willing to pay more 
to have access to modern storage. Since storage cost does not show wide variation from 
trader to trader with in the same market, it is not illogical to have positive but 
insignificant effect coming from storage cost. Traders which are engaged in longer 
temporal arbitration are more in need of storage facility than traders engaged in high turn 
over trade, so it is logical if they are willing to pay more.  
 
Traders which are complaining about activity of unlicensed traders are less willing to pay 
for commodity exchange service than others. This may be reflecting their fear that: if 
warehouse is used they may be forced to pay more tax. As result they can lose whatever 
competitive edge they have on unlicensed traders. This is clear indication that 
introduction of warehouse receipt need to be integrated with imposition of fair tax rates 
and crack down on unlicensed traders.  Traders which are observed to complain about 
lack of appropriate storage are observed to be less willing to pay for modern storage 
facility. This seems paradoxical on its face value, but if we consider the personal 
observation and informal discussion made with grain traders, it will become clear that 
there is very logical explanation for this observation. When traders complain about 
storage, most of their explanation revolves around high storage rent that they are paying 
and how they are forced to pay for month when they are even using the storage facility 
for one day. Means their complaints are not on lack of acceptable storage facility to their 
current need, but on unfair charges that they are facing. So what traders are looking is fair 
charge on use of storage facility. It is true that for having better temporal arbitration not 
only cost but quality of storage facilities have to be improved, but it is also important to 
note that fair balance need to be stroke between cost and modernity of the storage facility 
to attract large number of traders.                   
 
Another paradoxical result is observed when the fairness of current storage charges are 
considered. Traders which think the current rates are fair are willing to pay more than 
traders which are complaining about the charges. At face value this result may seem 
paradoxical; but if the above explanation is taken in to account, it is consistent with the 
observation of the researcher that cost sensitive traders may not be willing to pay more. 
In general traders located in Maychew, who are less cost sensitive, less connected, less 
experienced and having longer span of temporal arbitration are willing to pay for using 
storage service that can be provided by modern warehouse provider.      
 
When the warehouse receipt can serve as unit of account to facilitate exchange location 
parameters, social capital and experience seem to be important determinant factors; while 
costs do not seem to matter. Before this result is explained it is important to note that 
willingness to pay for simple storage is introduced as independent variable in order to 
focus on the marginal payment for using the receipt in exchange. This will improve the 
result in two ways. First the effect and co-variation of errors will be controlled, in order 
to focus on the marginal willingness and to avoid any omitted variable bias
35
. Second if 
                                                 
35
 Omitted variable is expected since there are many variables which can affect the three models 
simultaneously. The estimation of simultaneously tobit models or probit models is very complex, which 
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the marginal values are generated from the data, there is a need for using limited 
dependent variable and censured models, which are observed to be highly inappropriate 
for other contingency data collected in this paper.  The same is done on credit model 
which is having transaction variable as independent variable. Now let’s focus on the 
results.          
 
Traders located in Maychew and Himora are willing to pay more than other sites, if the 
warehouse receipt by serving as unit of account can facilitate exchange and reduce 
transaction cost. However different networks may contradict this move in all locations. 
Traders which are having better information network, that can easily use their 
information networks to facilitate transaction are not willing to pay for the use of such 
service. However controlling for information networks traders who have more contact on 
market and who can easily borrow from large number of traders to solve their short term 
liquidity problem will be willing to pay more. This is clear indication that the change in 
grain structure that can be generated after such changes can have complex interaction 
with existing social capital. In our case information networks will be easily replaced over 
long run by such formal institutions in which gross networks and loan networks will be a 
catalyst of such change. In the mean time well connected traders which can collect large 
information from information networks may not be easily attracted to such changes.           
 
If credit service is taken at a margin Alemata and Mokone traders are willing to pay less 
than others. It can imply that there is less need for credit in these markets, which is not 
the case. As was analyzed in SCP part, it was clear lack of finance is serious problem in 
all locations. And this is more the case in Southern part of Tigray where access to formal 
bank loan, other than MFI, is virtually absent in the last few years. The main point is that 
traders in these markets are looking for cheaper credit than other traders located in other 
markets. Note that traders often start as unlicensed traders in south, will accumulate 
capital and then will move to Mekelle and Himora. So the main point seems that traders 
in Maychew are highly desperate for any finance and traders in Alemata and Mokone are 
looking access to cheap finance. But it is clear that warehouse receipt that can serve as 
collateral needs to be started in both Mekelle and Himora first. This is because traders in 
these locations are willing to pay higher rate that can be expected at the start. Maychew, 
given its small market size, may not have adequate flow to make it feasible in short run. 
Once experience is gained and costs are able to be reduced, the services need to be 
extended at lower rate to southern markets.     
 
For all locations post high level traders, which are very small in number, are observed to 
have more demand for such service than others. This is clear indication that modern value 
and better information and education are fundamental for success of such service. Social 
capital does not seem to be an obstacle for expansion of such services. Traders which are 
having large information and loan networks in their own market are more willing to pay 
than others. This will show us two facts. First, expansion warehouse loan service will not 
face resistance from trader networks and second, networks are not able to provide 
                                                                                                                                                 
can be avoided by the above procedure, given the nature of the variables on hand. See Perali and Chavas 
(2000) for complexity of such approach   
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adequate liquidity for networked traders. This is in line with high compliant of traders 
observed in relation to lack of finance. Networks may be functioning more or less 
efficiently in dissemination of information; their efficiency in provision of short term 
loan is very limited. Traders which are less satisfied with current storage service provided 
for rent are willing to pay more than others. This is an indication that dissatisfied traders 
payment on storage will also increase, if traders are provided with modern storage service 
supplemented with warehouse receipt that can be used as collateral. In short than 
focusing on simple storage service, it is much needed that the warehouse receipts to be 
integrated with access to short term loan.     
 
In general in order to make sure that the informal structure is supplementing market 
development than being fetter of change, it is important that introduction modern 
warehouse service need to be integrated with provision of loan. The process need to be 
started in Himora and Mekelle, while other short term solutions are provided to solve 
storage and liquidity problems of southern markets, in general, and Maychew, in 
particular.  Once the necessary experience is gained and ways to cut cost are developed, it 
needs to be extended in to southern Tigray markets. In the due process introduction of 
fair tax assessment, crack down on illegal traders and education on such services is 
fundamental. Moreover there must be a mechanism found to encourage highly educated 
individuals, at least at post high level, to join grain trading, if the grain markets are going 
to evolve to ward modern grain markets. In doing so there must be clear understanding 
about the role of experience and informal institutions in facilitating grain trade under 
highly dysfunctional market structure. In short it must be about integrating the best of 
both worlds, i.e. more educated and less educated, than imposing one over the other.     
 
 Determinants of willing to use ECX Exchange service  
             
ECX exchange with gestation period of three days  
 
In this subpart of the paper, determinant of traders’ willingness to pay for ECX exchange 
service, which can take three day to complete is taken in to account. The analysis was 
initiated assuming the error term will have identically and independently distributed 
normal distribution. Unfortunately when Probit model is fitted two serious problems are 
encountered. In one side convergence was not possible unless some variables are 
excluded. The excluded variable are education and total transaction cost in buying grain. 
In other side the distributional assumptions imposed on the data in estimation process are 
found to be in appropriate (see table 36, below). In short the Probit model is miss 
specified and, unlike OLS version models, the effect of such specification will have 
unknown bias on both the parameter and standard errors (Green, 2000; Maddala, 1983 
and Verbeek, 2004). In short the Probit estimate given in table 37, below, are both biased 
and inconsistent. Excluding the above variables the fitted Probit model, given in table 37 
below, is found to have omitted variables, variable variance and none normal distribution. 
To solve these problems variables are added and dropped iteratively and 
heteroskedasticity Probit model is tired, but the problem was not able to be solved. That 
is why the Probit result will not be taken seriously and the analysis will focus on 
alternative models.  
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Table 36 Specification test for Probit and WLS model with 92 observations  
Parameter 
Probit 
Parameter 
LPM1 LPM2 
Statistics df. Prob. Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob. 
omitted variable 24.822 8 0.002 Ramsey RESET test  0.46 0.709 1.95 0.135 
heteroskedasticity 35.55 20 0.017 Breusch-Pagan  3.92 0.048 5.60 0.0180 
normality 25.271 2 0 IM test for normality 20.81 0.53 5.60 0.035
LR 91.14 15 0 VIF MAX (OLS) 6.65    6.19  
 
To deal with this problem, one option is to use Maximum score model of Manski (1975, 
1985). Maximum score model has advantage of being semi parametric in which it will 
not impose any distributional assumptions on the data. However the model has its own 
short comings. First, given the high computational requirement of the model, it was not 
possible to fit all variables in to the model. The Limdep software can fit up to 14 
independent variables, only (Green, 2000). Second, under such restrictions omitted 
variables are expected, but the effect of omitted variable on performance of the model is 
not clear (Manski, 1975, 1985). Given the model is trying to predict the actual 
probabilities; the Pseudo R
2
 is used to select the right specification of the model. The 
‘unrestricted’ model is given under Maximum score 1. This model is excluding education 
and search cost. The exclusion of these variables is based on the maximum limit of 14 
independent variables imposed by the software and Pseudo R
2
 observed from different 
combination of variables. But this general model is having insignificant parameters for all 
variables. So based on their significance level, variables are dropped one by one until the 
maximum Pseudo R
2 
of 93.5% is achieved (see table 37, below). Means the best model is 
given under Maximum Score model 2.      
 
A third option is to use linear probability model which imposes linear relationship 
between probability of willingness to pay and independent variables. The advantage of 
this model is that even though it is not beast unbiased Estimator (BUE), given 
probabilities does not have linear relation with variables, it beast linear unbiased 
estimator (BLUE), given the error terms are white noise. Moreover large number of 
variables can be used to avoid omitted variable bias due to its computational simplicity. 
To find BLUE result, the errors have to be white noise and as can be seen from table 36, 
above, the unrestricted model (LPM1) is not having omitted variables, none normal 
distribution and multicollinearity problem. Unfortunately the heteroskedasticity problem 
is not solved by using weighted least square. That is why robust standard errors are used 
to deal with heteroskedasticity problem. The restricted version of the model (LPM2) is 
not observed to affect the result significantly than to introduce excess skewness and 
kurtosis in to the model (see table 36, above and table 37, below) 
 
Given the restricted maximum score model or model 2 is having best fit, the unrestricted 
model 1 will be ignored for brevity. Based on the best fit model (Max. score2) 
determinants of the incidence of willingness to pay are related to level of satisfaction with 
brokers, the transaction cost faced by traders in current way of doing business and size of 
information network they have. When traders are less satisfied with current efficiency of 
brokers, when they are having less information network and when they are facing high 
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transaction cost they are observed to be willing to pay for ECX exchange service, which 
can take up to three days to finish the transaction process. The problem with this 
conclusion is that the variables are significant at 10% level, not at conventional 5% level, 
and the impact of omitted variables is unknown. So let’s see the LPM result, below. 
 
Table 37 Determinants of incidence of payment for using ECX exchange service which can take 3 days  
Variable 
Probit Max. score 1 Max. score 2 LPM1 LPM2 
Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Coeff. Prob. Prob. Coeff. Prob. 
Log of age -6.181 0.056     -0.225 0.219 -0.036 0.828 
Log of average satisfaction 
with broker  
0.994 0.038 -0.214 0.513 -0.474 0.09 0.069 0.008 0.044 0.012 
Alemata -14.181 0.014 -0.207 0.485 -0.155 0.561 -0.461 0.03 -0.497 0.009 
Maychew -1.463 0.643 0.521 0.303 -0.048 0.846 0.482 0.034 0.42 0.011 
Mokone -10.703 0.021 -0.01 0.971 -0.284 0.267 -0.461 0.091 -0.457 0.065 
Mekelle   
0.365 0.22 0.508 0.115 0.594 0.02 0.508 0.016 
Log of working capital -26.706 0.028 0.369 0.319   -0.236 0.356 -0.291 0.149 
Log of experience  2.733 0.064 -0.004 0.982   0.127 0.078 0.106 0.03 
Log of gross network in 
own market  
-1.673 0.267 0.071 0.732 0.144 0.16 0.021 0.656 
  
Log of information 
network in own market  
-5.11 0.039 -0.288 0.341 -0.243 0.081 -0.081 0.452 
  
Log of gross network in 
own market  
4.92 0.062 -0.131 0.641   0.11 0.288 
  
Log of search cost 0.445 0.511     -0.185 0.024 -0.078 0.009 
Log of buying cost 
  
-0.142 0.361 0.34 0.068 0.813 0.014 0.695 0.029 
Log of maximum distance 
traveled  
0.16 0.035 -0.035 0.566   0 0.998 0.004 0.599 
Log of loan network in 
distant market  
-0.494 0.08 0.362 0.133   -0.009 0.649   
Log of information 
network in distant market  
0.333 0.393 -0.287 0.17   
0.003 0.929 
  
Risk aversion parameter  1.912 0.068     0.153 0.268   
Less than 3   
    0.17 0.454 0.223 0.338 
Grade 7 - 8   
    0.114 0.154 0.088 0.208 
Grade 9 -12   
    0.375 0.033 0.203 0.065 
Post high   
    0.254 0.027 0.176 0.062 
Constant  133.473 0.017 -0.173 0.613 0.463 0.395 0.181 0.44 0.335 0.145 
Pseudo R
2
 or R
2
 0.7454  
0.902  0.935      
 
LPM1, which is having better specification from LPM models, is used as base of 
alternative analysis. This is unrestricted weighted least square model and its conclusions 
are stable weather variables are dropped or not. The effect of omitted variable and 
computational restrictions of maximum score method are obvious in table 37, above. 
Education and locational parameters are observed to be important determinants of 
incidence of willingness to pay. In terms of education high school and post high level 
traders are observe to be more willing to pay for using ECX service than others. In terms 
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of location, it seems the incidence of payment is high in deficit market of Maychew and 
Mekelle than others. Traders in both Alemata and Mokone are observed to be less willing 
to use ECX service than others. The control variable of Himora is observed to be in 
middle of both extremes.   
 
When education is taken in to account the effect of networks or level of social capital that 
a trader has is having insignificant impact on probability of payment. Since we are not 
sure if OLS model is better than the semi parametric maximum score model, it is not 
logical to reject the importance of networks. But it is highly rational to have reasonable 
reservation about the effectiveness of networks to create barrier of entry in grain trade. 
This is fact is more true, given the following paradoxical results observed, which can 
question the specification of LPM or WLS model. First, with in the LPM models more 
experienced traders are observed to be more willing to pay for ECX transaction service, 
which can take three days to complete. More experienced traders are expected to have 
better knowledge of doing things now and it is logical to expect resistance to change from 
their corner. But the model is not showing this result.          
 
Second, when buying cost increase by one percent the probability of paying for ECX 
service, which can take 3 days to complete, will increase by 81%, however if the increase 
is coming from search cost, which account for 20% of buying cost on average, search 
cost will farther reduce probability of payment by more than 18%. So if search cost is 20 
birr then buying cost will be 100 birr. So if search cost increase by one birr, it is 5% 
increase and this will generate more than 90% decline in probability of payment. 
However it will also cause 1% increase in buying cost generating close to 81% increase 
in willing to pay. On average there will be a marginal decline of close to 9% on 
willingness to pay for using ECX exchange service which can take 3 days. It is 
theoretical clear why traders with large transaction cost are more willing to pay, but it is 
not clear why traders are less willing, when the increase is coming from transaction cost. 
The logical conclusion is that search cost, after controlling total transaction cost, is 
serving as proxy for other unobserved variables and model miss specification. Another 
paradoxical result is observed when satisfaction with current service of brokers is 
observed. The LPM is showing that when traders are more satisfied with the brokers’ 
service they are more willing to pay for ECX exchange service than when they are less 
satisfied. This is another theoretically unsound result observed from LPM.  
 
In general the educated guess that can be done based on the above less than ideal models 
and logical reflection is that traders located in deficit market of Maychew and Mekelle, 
which are facing high transaction cost, which are more educated compared to most 
traders and are less satisfied with service provided by brokers are more probable to be 
willing to pay for ECX service that can take up to three days to complete. There are high 
chances that experienced and traders with small information network will pay less. 
Unfortunately the effect of experience and information network is model specific so it is 
hardly possible to analyze their effect from current data set and models used.       
 
It would be more informative, if not only determinants of incidence of willingness to pay 
for ECX exchange service, which can take up to three days, but also determinants of 
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willingness to pay are analyzed. Given the error is white noise, this can be done by using 
Tobit model. Unfortunately the same specification problems observed in Probit model 
and also observed in the Tobit model. Even logarthimic transformation and 
heteroskedasticity model were not able to solve the problem. Since Tobit model with out 
appropriate specification is both biased and inconsistent (Green, 2000; Maddala, 1983 
and Verbeek, 2004), the result are given in appendix, but will not be discussed here.  
 
Alternatively if ECX was able to reduce the duration of the transaction to just 1 hour, 
only 7 traders are observed to reject the use of exchange service of ECX. As result, 
following the recommendation of Maddala (1983) simple OLS model is used to identify 
determinants of willingness to pay minus unobserved transaction cost. To estimate the 
model either dropping the 7 observations or introducing dummy for zero values is 
observed to generate independently, identically and normally distributed error term. In 
order to avoid the unnecessary loss of observations, introduction of dummy variables for 
missing values is preferred in this paper. All the specifications selected are not having 
any serious omitted variable, Skewness, heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity 
problems (see table, 38, below). One exception is that the null of excess kurtosis is 
rejected at 9% level for the last model (not reported for brevity). For other models the 
null of excess kurtosis is rejected even when 10% level type 2 errors is allowed. Since 
OLS version models are asymptotically robust for none normal distribution (see Verbeek, 
2004) and the parameters are stable from model to model, it is logical to accept the model 
result at their face value.  
 
Table 38 Specification test for regression in table 39 with 92 observations  
Parameter 
full model 
best based on 
restricted  R2 
best based on 
normality 
Statistics Probability Statistics Probability Statistics Probability 
R2 0.9579 
 
0.9547 
 
0.9532 
 
Adj R2 0.9445 
 
0.9503 
 
0.9498 
 
Ramsey RESET  1.16 0.3334 218.67 0.2549 0.11 0.9532 
MAX VIF 6.38 
 
1.87 
 
1.52 
 
Breusch-Pagan  1.72 0.1898 1.8 0.1802 1.57 0.2104 
F statistics 71.42 0 218.67 0 288.25 0 
IM test for normality 21.44 0.554236 14.3 0.112047 6 0.539749 
observations 92 
 
92 
 
92 
 
 
If exchange service of ECX is adjusted to be completed in short period of time, traders 
located mainly in Maychew, but also in Mekelle, are willing to pay more (see table 39, 
below). In general traders located in deficit markets are more willing to pay than traders 
located in surplus markets. Traders which are located in Mokone, who were having 
serious shortage of marketable output due to extended drought observed for last three 
years, were less willing to pay for using modern and fast exchange that can be provided 
by ECX. All other parameters, except one, are insignificant despite high R
2
 and low 
multicollinearity problem; implying that if the service is able to modified to the need of 
traders, in terms of short gestation of transaction, it will not be constrained by lack of 
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capital, education, social resistance and others. The exception is that as the trader is able 
to create long dimension spatial arbitration the more he/she is willing to pay for using 
ECX exchange service that can only take one hour.  
           
Table 39 determinants of willingness to pay for using ECX exchange service which can end in 1 hour, 
dependent variable log of contingent payment   
Independent Variable 
(dependent variable log of payment) 
 
full model 
best based on 
restricted  R2 
best based on 
normality 
Coff. Prob. Coff. Prob. Coff. Prob. 
Log of age 0.318 0.385 
    Log of average satisfaction with broker  -0.063 0.208 
    Less than 3
rd
 grade -0.114 0.546 
    Grade 7 - 8 -0.19 0.295 
    Grade 9 -12 0.041 0.838 
    Post high -0.121 0.572 
    Alemata 0.142 0.572 0.123 0.498 0.028 0.866 
Maychew 0.439 0.049 0.421 0.017 0.383 0.028 
Mokone -0.451 0.046 -0.478 0.006 -0.519 0.002 
Mekelle 0.295 0.215 0.316 0.069 0.279 0.088 
Log of working capital 0.6 0.308 0.52 0.268 
  Log of experaince  -0.057 0.604 
    Log of gross network in own market  -0.128 0.25 -0.093 0.232 
  Log of information network in own market  0.018 0.906 
    Log of gross network in own market  0.035 0.813 
    Log of search cost 0.054 0.338 
    Log of maximum distance traveled  0.036 0.036 0.036 0.003 0.035 0.003 
Log of maximum duration of storage 0.008 0.753 
    Log of gross network in distant market -0.014 0.598 
    Log of information network in distant market 0.024 0.637 
    Risk aversion 0 0.697 
    Zero 7.404 0 7.469 0 7.553 0 
Constant  -9.712 0.001 -8.427 0 -6.651 0 
 
Personal observation of the trader reviles that the dynamic, well capitalized and well 
connected traders are the one engaged in long distance trade. In this study positive and 
significant correlation is observed between long distance trade and capital. Study by 
Gabre-Madhin et al. (2003) found that less capitalized traders in Ethiopia are virtually 
absent from distance trade. Moreover when traders, which are not creating space utility, 
are asked “If they are transporting grain from one location to another for profit”, the 
common answer were not yes or no. Traders were reporting their health status, capital, 
connection and others to say that they are only buying from local traders. Given this facts 
it is more logical to conclude that more connected, well capitalized, health and young 
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traders, which are able to engage on long distance trader, are more willing to pay than 
others.        
 
In general unless the gestation period is reduced, ECX may not able to attract most 
traders except those which are more educated, which are facing high transaction cost and 
which are highly dissatisfied with current service provided by brokers. However when 
the gestation period of transaction is reduced to half or one hour, it will attract most of the 
traders and more than others, dynamic and vibrant traders which are engaged in long 
distance trade will be attracted more. In terms of location traders located in deficit market 
of Maychew and Mekelle seems to be more willing to pay to use the modern exchange 
service that can be facilitated by ECX than others. The opposite is the case for traders 
located in Mokone, while Himora and Alemata traders are found in the middle. Since the 
service of ECX is more viable in surplus producing than deficit markets it is important to 
give due attention to market failures that can constrain the participation of potential ECX 
customers form surplus producing markets.    
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Conclusion and recommendation 
 
Grain trade is financial capital intensive business and traders who can have preferential 
access to such resources can have competitive edge over others. In the study sties there is 
high concentration of capital among few traders, but with fairly strong competition 
among most traders. Rich traders seem to concentrate on luxury, export and high margin 
grains like coffee, Sesame and Teff, leaving other traders to face serious competition on 
what is left over. Traders studied in the sites seem to have better business assets 
endowment compared to trades found in many developing countries. But this does not 
mean traders are not facing serious asset related constrains. This is observed on the fact 
that significant majority of traders identify lack of finance and good quality storage 
facility as important problems in their market. In short grain market in studied sites is far 
from being highly efficient and functional.  
 
In terms of education, grain trade is not often done by either illiterate or highly educated 
individuals. Most traders speak Amharic and Tigrigna, as result they may not face serious 
problem in penetrating most part of Ethiopia grain market. However, given low 
educational attainment of most traders and their incapability to communicate in foreign 
languages, they may not able to penetrate international grain markets, except Middle East 
countries. Some traders in Himora did have capacity to communicate in Arabic, so they 
will have competitive edge over other traders to penetrate Arabic specking countries. In 
general there is a need to facilitate the participation of educated individuals in grain trade, 
with out ignoring the importance of experience and informal institutions.   
 
Most traders are Orthodox christens and first generation traders, with less experience and 
low level of meso trust, but with large sized micro networks. Traders actually trust none 
traders over other traders and brokers, which reflects the inefficient coordination and 
allocation process found in the market. In simple words, the most serious challenge in the 
market seems to be the existence of very low trust in face of dysfunctional market and 
state. Moreover, collusion among rich traders or meso trust defined in capital dimensions 
does not exist in most markets, except Mokone. So the problem of grain market, in the 
sites, is not none proportional distribution of trust or collusion, but lack of trust in the first 
place. That is why serious work needs to be done to improve both meso and macro trust; 
in which commodity exchange is one important component of it, but not the only 
component. There is a need to facilitate the development of trade associations to create 
trust, refine gossip and facilitate the emergence of informal developmental values. The 
sole purpose of such institution should be to facilitate the development of meso level 
trust, as stepping stone to the creation of macro trust. In doing so, transparent work needs 
to be done to avoid any political interference in the process. Unfortunately, meso trust 
can be a fetter of change to ward macro trust once it takes root. That is why some work 
needs to be done to make sure that there is easy entry to such associations. This will make 
them inclusive than exclusive groups.         
  
There is easy entry in to grain market, in which traders don’t even need license or large 
capital to start business, especially in southern Tigray. Unfortunately, effective entry is 
constrained by lack of micro network and capital. That is why the development of trade 
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associations that can facilitate the expansion inclusive groups is critically needed to 
improve dynamics of grain market.  
 
Networks are found to be efficient price information distributors among networked 
members; while the mass media is found to be the least used and the least reliable source 
of information with in the grain market. This is in line with early study of Gabre-Madhin 
et al. (2003). Mass media is used to access information on international prices, 
government policy and output at national level. However the level of grade, given by 
traders, to the information collected from mass media on these variables is very low. This 
is clear indication that traders are not working in vacuum of misinformation and they are 
using alternative sources to weight, each and every information, for its reliability. So, if 
mass media is going to be an important source information, ECX needs to give due 
emphasis to the reliability of the data and a lot of work is needs to be done to convince 
traders that such reliable data is actually reliable. This is so since grain trade is very risky 
activity any misinformation, by any one, can easily jeopardize the future of the trader. 
Under such reality huge resource needs to be allocated to facilitate collection of reliable 
information and to changing traders’ perception to ward such information.           
                       
Brokers are used in distance markets, but not in own market, and traders are satisfied 
with current exchange facilitating role of brokers. But this satisfaction has to be taken 
with grain of salt, as it will be clear below. The problem is that they seem to be operating 
in low trust environment, which can put huge penalty on market efficiency. Network of 
traders are the most important source of information and they seem to do it much 
efficiently than brokers. But lack of trust on brokers than lack of reliable information 
seems to be the main problem found in the relationship between brokers and traders. 
Even though most traders seem to be some how satisfied with current storage service, it is 
hard to take this result at its face value. This is because expectation is function of current 
challenges. If they are having many serious challenges as lack of finance, it is natural that 
they will accept some miner challenges as normal. This is the well known concept of 
revisable nature of utility advocated by Sen (1984). This is also the case given the fact 
that lack of storage is raised by many traders as one of the series problems of grain trade.            
 
In terms of capital growth, southern markets are sites where traders can start business 
with less capital and with out licensee to accumulate minimum capital that they need to 
enter the lucrative business of Mekelle and Himora. Even though there is no direct 
evidence in the study, grain trade is highly risky, less rewarding and is not an occupation 
that most grain traders are pushing their children to work on. That is why if well educated 
individuals are going to start grain trading business, it is more rational if they start in 
surplus food grain producing part of the region. Once they accumulate the necessary 
capital, experience and connection, they can easily penetrate other markets.          
    
Even though the priority of each market, except the most serious problem of lack of 
finance, is different from market to market, implying single strategy can’t followed in 
each and every market development process; lack of finance, activity of illegal traders 
and demand uncertainty are the three most often mentioned problems of all markets.  
Given the above structure, conduct and level of market development most grain traders 
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are observed to have low dimension of temporal and spatial arbitration. Means traders are 
not efficiently arbitrating spatial and temporal price differentials. Or the market is highly 
inefficient. It is clear that works needs to be done on improving traders’ access to finance 
through warehouse receipt or other institutions in all markets. However, different 
approaches needed to be followed in different markets, if the efficiency of the grain 
market is going to be improved in sustainable manner. Let’s remember one shoe can not 
fit every feet and one medicine can not heal every sickness!    
 
If ECX or other institution is able to provide modern warehouse service, it can easily find 
huge demand among traders. Additionally, the current rates fixed by ECX for storing 
wheat can be easily paid by most traders. This is more so, if the receipt can be used in 
transaction and especially to access bank credit. However work is need to be done in 
finding middle ground between modern grade and standards fixed (or expected to be 
fixed) by ECX and traditional grade and standards that are been in use now. In mean 
time, it is not wise to use clearing house facility and each trader’s grain needs to be stored 
separately, as was the case for Coffee market before establishment of ECX. One final 
point in relation to warehouse is that proper balance between quality and storage charges 
need to be stroked, if there is going to be adequate demand for warehouse service.   
 
Traders are looking for some form of improved exchange service, which does not 
demand long time to complete and does not demand huge cost. There is need to develop 
an auction market as stepping stone to ward advanced commodity exchange than pushing 
highly modern exchange service that can’t cover its cost. This was the case in early years 
of Eastern and central European commodity exchanges including the most successful 
exchange in that area, Budapest Commodity Exchange of Hungary. Since market 
development is a public good, government should facilitate and subsidize the up grading 
process. This is so, since such low cost low service exchange may not be able to up grade 
themselves, in the long run. Traders are looking for exchange service that can be 
completed with in half to one hour, not a current practice which can take 2 to 3 days. 
Moreover coffee, sesame and other luxury and export commodities marketed to the 
domestic economy needs to be treated differently than their export counter part, if better 
to do traders are going to be attracted to the exchange.               
 
In order to make sure that the informal structure is supplementing market development 
than being fetter of change, it is important that introduction modern warehouse service 
need to be integrated with provision of loan. The process need to be started in Himora 
and Mekelle, while other short term solutions are provided to solve storage and liquidity 
problems of southern markets, in general, and Maychew, in particular.  Once the 
necessary experience is gained and ways to cut cost are developed, it needs to be 
extended in to southern Tigray markets. In the due process introduction of fair tax 
assessment, crack down on illegal traders and education on such services is fundamental. 
Moreover there must be a mechanism found to encourage highly educated individuals, at 
least at post high level, to join grain trading, if the grain markets are going to evolve to 
ward modern grain markets. In doing so there must be clear understanding about the role 
of experience and informal institutions in facilitating grain trade under highly 
dysfunctional market structure. In short it must be about integrating the best of both 
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worlds, i.e. more educated but less connected and less educated but more connected, than 
imposing one over the other.     
 
For ECX service that can take up to three days, traders located in deficit market of 
Maychew and Mekelle, which are facing high transaction cost, which are more educated 
compared to most traders and are less satisfied with service provided by brokers are more 
probable to be willing to pay for using ECX exchange service. There are high chances 
that experienced traders and traders with small information network will pay less. The 
effect of experience and information network is found to be model specific, though. 
Fortunately, if ECX exchange service is facilitated to be completed in half to one hour, 
whatever resistance that can be expected from current structure will evaporate and most 
traders will be willing to use it. Additionally, dynamic traders, which are normally well 
connected, well capitalized and innovative, will be attracted more than others in to the 
exchange service of ECX. In simple words the only way to facilitate the transformation 
of the market is not found in one time revolution toward modern market, but in finding 
middle ground between current and modern structure, which can have least cost in terms 
of money, time and other resources. Modernization is not some thing that can be dressed 
like fashion cloth, when you need it. It is some thing that evolves out of complex 
institutional structure, when necessary conducive environment is created. This includes 
the development of auction centers, imposition of fair taxes, crack down on illegal 
traders, development of independent trade associations and development of credible, 
reliable and trustworthy market information system.       
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Appendix 
Tobit model  
Table 40 Determinants of willingness to pay for using ECX exchange service which can take 3 days  
Variable Coef. Std. t- value Prob. 
Log of age -1.976 1.255 -1.57 0.12 
Log of average satisfaction with broker  0.027 0.083 0.33 0.746 
Less than 3 0.34 0.605 0.56 0.576 
Grade 7 - 8 0.285 0.581 0.49 0.626 
Grade 9 -12 0.582 0.612 0.95 0.345 
Post high 0.018 0.736 0.02 0.98 
Alemata -3.168 1.061 -2.99 0.004 
Maychew 0.06 1.024 0.06 0.953 
Mokone -2.803 1.003 -2.8 0.007 
Mekelle 0.45 1.018 0.44 0.66 
Log of working capital -2.426 1.839 -1.32 0.192 
Log of experience  0.811 0.36 2.25 0.028 
Log of gross network in own market  -0.169 0.364 -0.46 0.644 
Log of information network in own market  -0.513 0.491 -1.04 0.301 
Log of loan network in own market  0.821 0.485 1.69 0.095 
Log of search cost 0.022 0.29 0.08 0.939 
Log of buying cost -0.31 1.317 -0.24 0.814 
Log of maximum distance traveled  0.018 0.053 0.34 0.738 
Log of loan network in distant market  -0.153 0.084 -1.81 0.075 
Log of information network in distant market  0.193 0.151 1.28 0.206 
Risk aversion parameter  0.256 0.381 0.67 0.504 
Constant  17.362 9.346 1.86 0.068 
sigma 1.495 0.142 
  
 
Table 41 Specification test for Tobit model based OPG or score test  
Parameter 
Probit 
Statistics df. Prob. 
omitted variable 61.5932 3 0 
heteroskedasticity 71.6294 24 0 
normality 68.929 2 0 
LR 54.34 21 0 
 
